The Solution
Luke 1:1-4; Luke 24:13-32
Key Thought: Jesus' bodily resurrection happened historically and is culturally and personally relevant and challenging, a challenge we cannot simply dismiss.
Historical Context:
· Luke investigates this matter thoroughly. Love makes Himself evident on the road to Emmaus and in the breaking of the bread.
Sermon Points:
I. Doubt: We Can't Trust the Biblical Account of the Resurrection Historically
--The resurrection narratives of the gospels developed later, long after the events themselves.
Answer:
1. "The content is far too counterproductive for the gospels to be legends," (104). Keller is answering the claim that "the gospels were written by the leaders of the early church to promote their policies, consolidate their power, and build their movement," (104). Keller asks, if that is so, why do they not have Jesus speaking on circumcision? Why invent the story of the crucifixion, which makes Jesus look like a criminal? Why invent Jesus' Gethsemane experience, or crying out on the cross, which makes Jesus look like a weak failure? Why make (culturally incredible) women the first witnesses of His resurrection, rather than (culturally credible) men? Why paint the apostles as "petty and jealous, almost impossibly slow-witted, and in the end as cowards who either actively or passively failed their master?" (105). Why reveal the horrible failure of Peter? None of that makes sense if the claim Keller is countering is true - it makes more sense that the authors did not feel free to fictionalize or polish up the facts. Look at the Gnostic "gospels" in comparison: being rescued from the dark, evil material world by secret gnosis appealed to Greeks and Romans, whereas the canonical gospels offended the dominant views with a "positive view of material creation and their emphasis on the poor and oppressed," (106).
2. "The timing is far too early for the gospels to be legends," (101). Dan Brown's "The Da Vinci Code" is to blame for a lot of misinformation, including the myth that Constantine decreed Christ's divinity and suppressed all evidence of His humanity in 325 A.D., when clearly "no more than twenty years after the death of Christ, we see that Christians were worshipping Jesus as God (Philippians 2)," (103). The doctrine of Jesus' divinity didn't begin with Constantine-it was accepted from the beginning. Constantine didn't help the church win-Constantine "backed a winner". Look at the Gnostic "gospels" in comparison: "the Syriac traditions in Thomas can be dated to 175 A.D. at the earliest, more than a hundred years after the time that the canonical gospels were in widespread use. …The gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, however, were recognized as authoritative eyewitness accounts almost immediately, and so we have Irenaeus of Lyons in 160 A.D. declaring that there were four, and only four, gospels," (103). These documents wouldn't have gotten off the ground and past the eyewitnesses unless the events actually happened. "The first accounts of the empty tomb and eyewitnesses are not found in the gospels … but in the letters of Paul, which every historian agrees were written just fifteen to twenty years after the death of Jesus," (203). Jesus' bodily resurrection was proclaimed from the very beginning. See for example 1 Corinthians 15:3-6. Paul not only refers to the empty tomb and resurrection on the third day (historical account; details not permitted to be changed) - he also lists the eyewitnesses … individuals, small groups, five hundred people at once - most still alive to easily corroborate (Luke 1:1-4; Mark 15:21; 1 Corinthians 15:1-6) or kill (safe and easy travel during the pax Romana) the story that remained alive because it was true. In order for altered accounts to gain acceptance, the eyewitnesses, and their offspring, must all be dead. If Jesus had never done or said the things the gospel writers and Paul wrote about - their writings never would have been accepted because the living witnesses would have stomped them down. Acts 26:26. The first eyewitnesses were women whose testimony in that culture was not admissible evidence in court-such details of the historical account were too well known to be changed, despite cultural pressure. If there had been no empty tomb, no one would have believed the sightings were of the 'resurrected' Jesus (as opposed to the ghost of Jesus), especially since…
3. The claim that Jesus bodily resurrected (individual resurrection) was not available to the Jewish imagination (was inconceivable), and would not have been well-received by those of either Jewish or Greco-Roman culture, and so does not work as a made-up excuse for why the tomb was empty (as some claim it to be). In the Greco-Roman culture, resurrection was not only impossible, but totally undesirable. The Gnostic "gospels" appealed to that culture when they spoke of being rescued from the dark, evil material world by secret gnosis, whereas the canonical gospels offended the dominant views with a "positive view of material creation," (106). Christians acknowledge our bodies as God's sacred temple, His holy dwelling place-not something to escape, but something to be glorified in resurrection (Ravi Zacharias, Jesus Among Other Gods, Thomas Nelson, 2000). According to Jewish teaching, the resurrection doesn't happen to one person in the middle of history - it happens to all believers at the end of history. Individual resurrections were not available to the Jewish imagination to write eyewitness testimony off as hallucination, or to write off the empty tomb as resulting from the disciples stealing Jesus' body in hopes that others would believe He had been resurrected. In addition, "There were dozens of other messianic pretenders whose lives and careers ended the same way Jesus' did. Why would the disciples of Jesus have come to the conclusion that his crucifixion had not been a defeat but a triumph-unless they had seen him risen from the dead?" (208). In addition, "it was absolute blasphemy to propose that any human being should be worshipped. Yet hundreds of Jews began worshipping Jesus literally overnight. The hymn to Christ as God that Paul quotes in Philippians 2 is generally recognized to have been written just a few years after the crucifixion," (209-210).
"The Christian view of resurrection, absolutely unprecedented in history, sprang up full-blown immediately after the death of Jesus. There was no process of development. … They were just telling others what they had seen themselves," (209). … To bail out by saying that miracle is impossible, is to leave such [issues] unanswered (refer back to third sermon on science/faith). People from the first century had just as much reason to be skeptical about an individual resurrecting, yet the church was born and grew because they let the evidence speak for itself.
4. "The literary form of the gospels is too detailed to be legend," (106). This is an interesting section that says, if the gospels were fiction, they "suddenly anticipated the whole technique of modern novelistic, realistic narrative," (C.S. Lewis) - which "only developed within the last three hundred years," (106). Keller notes there is a lot of irrelevant detail that only makes sense to include if it actually happened and was part of the author's recollective memory. He notes that "disciples in the ancient world were expected to memorize masters' teachings, and that many of Jesus' statements are presented in a form that was actually designed for memorization," (106). He also notes Jan Vansina's "study of oral traditions in primitive African cultures, in which fictional legends and historical accounts are clearly distinguished from each other and much greater care is taken to preserve historical accounts accurately," (108).
5. If you do not accept the historical reality of Jesus' resurrection: "You must then come up with a historically feasible alternate explanation for the birth of the church," (202). Compare John 20:19 and Acts 2:14, and answer this question: what explains the change in Jesus' disciples, from being full of fear, to being full of boldness? Answer: the resurrection.
I. Doubt: We Can't Trust the Bible Culturally or Personally
1. Answer: "Here's how I advised him and other people on how to deal with a Scripture text that appeared objectionable or offensive to them. … slow down and try out several different perspectives on the issues that trouble them. …the passage that bothers them might not teach what it appears to them to be teaching. Many of the texts people find offensive can be cleared up with a decent commentary that puts the issue into historical context. …"
2. More Specific Doubt: "'The Christian God sounds like the vengeful gods of primitive times who needed to be appeased by human sacrifice.' Why can't God just accept everyone or at least those who are sorry for their wrongdoings?" (p. 187).
Answer: forgiveness is not 'cheap grace' -- it is a death leading to resurrection. "[y]ou are absorbing the debt, taking the cost of it completely on yourself instead of taking it out of the other person. It hurts terribly. Many people would say it feels like a kind of death" (p. 189). Do you think that, if God is good, it would require that He has made His love of good and hatred of evil manifest? Would it require His love be optional, lest it not be love? Would it require He do something to bring evil to justice? Would you think that if He has not done that, He (given He exists) is not good? "Therefore the God of the Bible is not like the primitive deities who demanded our blood for their wrath to be appeased. Rather, this is a God who becomes human and offers his own lifeblood in order to honor moral justice and merciful love," (192). "On the cross neither justice nor mercy loses out-both are fulfilled at once," (197).
3. "To reject the Bible as regressive is to assume that you have now arrived at the ultimate historic moment, from which all that is regressive and progressive can be discerned. …
4. "To stay away from Christianity because part of the Bible's teaching is offensive to you assumes that if there is a God he wouldn't have any views that upset you. … If Jesus is the Son of God, then we have to take his teaching seriously, including his confidence in the authority of the whole Bible. If he is not who he says he is, why should we care what the Bible says about anything else? … If you don't trust the Bible enough to let it challenge and correct your thinking, how could you ever have a personal relationship with God? … Only if your God can say things that outrage you and make you struggle (as in a real friendship or marriage!) will you know that you have gotten hold of a real God and not a figment of your imagination. So an authoritative Bible is not the enemy of a personal relationship with God. It is the precondition for it," (109-114).
Embracing the text: "were not our hearts burning within us as He opened to us the Scripture?" heart: seat of whole person burn: uncontrollable desire for someone - as He opened to us the Scripture. V.27 --It ain't about anybody in the Bible (legalistic: be awesome!)--it's about what God did through them and would do as Jesus. It's about what our hearts burn for. If the Bible has no authority, if we don't submit to it, we've got a Stepford God. We must be challenged, and that cannot happen if we pick and choose and put a chip in Him-make Him in our image. Jesus bled Scripture.
END: I liked the Tolstoy quote which began the chapter: (excerpt) "Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?" (201). "If the resurrection of Jesus happened, however, that means there's infinite hope and reason to pour ourselves out for the needs of the world," (212). Because, if His resurrection happened, everything He taught is eternal truth we can discover and must accept, not just something He made up and can be easily dismissed.
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
ch. 12-the (true) story of the cross
ch. 13-the reality of the resurrection (IMPORTANT)
Literalism: Isn't the Bible historically unreliable and regressive? Luke 1:1-4; 24:13-32
This is covered in RFG ch. 7: You can't take the bible literally.
Questions
1. The timing is too early and the content too counter-productive and detailed for the gospel accounts of Christ's resurrection to be legends. As an explanation for the empty tomb, Jews would never make up the claim that Jesus had bodily resurrected, because they did not believe in individual resurrection, and the Greco-Roman culture would have rather escaped the body, not returned to it. If Jesus' resurrection is not the explanation for the birth of the church-what is?
2. What do you do when you read something in the Bible that offends you? Have you considered that you might have misinterpreted the passage? Have you consulted several commentaries? Do you actually prefer the offensive interpretation, because it validates your skepticism (suggesting a bias)? If your interpretation is correct, and it still offends you-what is the source of your definition of a 'real' good which is offended by what you read in the Bible? Would you prefer a Stepford God?
3. Love is not love without demonstration. If there is a 'real' source of goodness and love, wouldn't it require that He has demonstrated that goodness, that love? Wouldn't you think that if He has not done anything about evil, God is not good? Do you accept Jesus' death and resurrection as a demonstration of God's love of good and dealing with the problem of evil?
4. Compare John 20:19 and Acts 2:14, and answer this question: what explains the change in Jesus' disciples, from being full of fear, to being full of boldness?
Quotes
"Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?" - Tolstoy
"If the resurrection of Jesus happened, however, that means there's infinite hope and reason to pour ourselves out for the needs of the world." - Tim Keller
1. "The content is far too counterproductive for the gospels to be legends," (104). Keller is answering the claim that "the gospels were written by the leaders of the early church to promote their policies, consolidate their power, and build their movement," (104). Keller asks, if that is so, why do they not have Jesus speaking on circumcision? Why invent the story of the crucifixion, which makes Jesus look like a criminal? Why invent Jesus' Gethsemane experience, or crying out on the cross, which makes Jesus look like a weak failure? Why make (culturally incredible) women the first witnesses of His resurrection, rather than (culturally credible) men? Why paint the apostles as "petty and jealous, almost impossibly slow-witted, and in the end as cowards who either actively or passively failed their master?" (105). Why reveal the horrible failure of Peter? None of that makes sense if the claim Keller is countering is true - it makes more sense that the authors did not feel free to fictionalize or polish up the facts. Look at the Gnostic "gospels" in comparison: being rescued from the dark, evil material world by secret gnosis appealed to Greeks and Romans, whereas the canonical gospels offended the dominant views with a "positive view of material creation and their emphasis on the poor and oppressed," (106). Quotes by Tim Keller.
2. "The timing is far too early for the gospels to be legends," (101). Dan Brown's "The Da Vinci Code" is to blame for a lot of misinformation, including the myth that Constantine decreed Christ's divinity and suppressed all evidence of His humanity in 325 A.D., when clearly "no more than twenty years after the death of Christ, we see that Christians were worshipping Jesus as God (Philippians 2)," (103). The doctrine of Jesus' divinity didn't begin with Constantine-it was accepted from the beginning. Constantine didn't help the church win-Constantine "backed a winner". Look at the Gnostic "gospels" in comparison: "the Syriac traditions in Thomas can be dated to 175 A.D. at the earliest, more than a hundred years after the time that the canonical gospels were in widespread use. …The gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, however, were recognized as authoritative eyewitness accounts almost immediately, and so we have Irenaeus of Lyons in 160 A.D. declaring that there were four, and only four, gospels," (103). These documents wouldn't have gotten off the ground and past the eyewitnesses unless the events actually happened. See 1 Corinthians 15:3-6, Luke 1:1-4; Mark 15:21; 1 Corinthians 15:1-6, Acts 26:26. Quotes by Tim Keller.
3. The claim that Jesus bodily resurrected (individual resurrection) was not available to the Jewish imagination (was inconceivable), and would not have been well-received by those of either Jewish or Greco-Roman culture, and so does not work as a made-up excuse for why the tomb was empty (as some claim it to be). In the Greco-Roman culture, resurrection was not only impossible, but totally undesirable. The Gnostic "gospels" appealed to that culture when they spoke of being rescued from the dark, evil material world by secret gnosis, whereas the canonical gospels offended the dominant views with a "positive view of material creation," (106). Christians acknowledge our bodies as God's sacred temple, His holy dwelling place-not something to escape, but something to be glorified in resurrection (Ravi Zacharias, Jesus Among Other Gods, Thomas Nelson, 2000). According to Jewish teaching, the resurrection doesn't happen to one person in the middle of history - it happens to all believers at the end of history. Individual resurrections were not available to the Jewish imagination to write eyewitness testimony off as hallucination, or to write off the empty tomb as resulting from the disciples stealing Jesus' body in hopes that others would believe He had been resurrected. Quotes by Tim Keller.
"…how to deal with a Scripture text that appeared objectionable or offensive to them. … slow down and try out several different perspectives on the issues that trouble them. …the passage that bothers them might not teach what it appears to them to be teaching. Many of the texts people find offensive can be cleared up with a decent commentary that puts the issue into historical context. … To reject the Bible as regressive is to assume that you have now arrived at the ultimate historic moment, from which all that is regressive and progressive can be discerned. … To stay away from Christianity because part of the Bible's teaching is offensive to you assumes that if there is a God he wouldn't have any views that upset you. … Only if your God can say things that outrage you and make you struggle (as in a real friendship or marriage!) will you know that you have gotten hold of a real God and not a figment of your imagination. So an authoritative Bible is not the enemy of a personal relationship with God. It is the precondition for it," (109-114). Quotes by Tim Keller.
The Truth...The Solution / Paul VK
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truth-the-solution.mp3
Where is your focus? Is it in something you can learn about and enjoy forever? If not, how is that working out for you?
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
RFG sermon series ideas: Let's Dance
Let's Dance
John 17:13-24
Key Thought: God's creation is an outpouring from the fullness of His love, and our part in creation is joining in that dance with Him and eachother.
Historical Context:
Jesus' prayer after the Last Supper, before His betrayal in the Garden of Gethsemane.
Sermon Points:
--God's plan as revealed in the Bible: a drama in four acts: creation, fall, redemption, restoration.
Act I: Creation
God's creation is an outpouring from the fullness of His love (essence of Trinity).
Act II: Fall
We fall away from God's perfect love every time our focus strays from Him.
Act III: Redemption
The Son of God was born into the world to put things right between us and God.
Act IV: Restoration
On earth as it is in Heaven. Glory to God in the highest goes with peace (shalom) on earth (rather than escaping it).
--The Christian Life:
1. Forgiveness is a means of salvation, but not the end or purpose of it.
2. God will use us, Christians (a.k.a. revolutionaries), to restore peace as we honor and glorify Him, serve eachother, and care for creation, naturally and artistically.
3. As our focus is centered on God, and as He uses us to restore peace (shalom), we live the Christian life assured of eventual success. How is God using you/church?
--Before Embarking on the Christian Journey:
1. Examine your motives; realize God is not a means to an end-He is the end.
2. Count the cost-this is an all-or-nothing choice (note U2 quote page 229-230). "God incarnate". This does not call for a "mild" response.
3. Take inventory of your reservations and share them with others (including Christians at various stages of their journey) to get feedback-doubts, aspects of Christianity that bother you, perceived inconsistencies, fears about how it will affect your life.
Joining the Dance:
1. Repent. "I'm a good person, I don't need salvation" is what we say when we have done good things to prove ourselves (meaning that people we judge not to be "good" are not "worthy")-we need to repent from that and everything else we've been relying on besides God's love, for our hope, security and significance.
2. Believe Jesus became human and sacrificed Himself for you on the cross and rose again, but don't just believe it intellectually-trust in Him. It doesn't matter if your trust starts out weak and small-what matters is Who you are trusting. He will strengthen and perfect your faith, teach you how to dance (brought you to the dance floor).
3. Put the first two into action and join His community (church).
Used these sources:
ch. 14-the dance of God (and epilogue)
Quotes
"The purpose of Jesus' coming is to put the whole world right, to renew and restore the creation, not to escape it. It is not just to bring personal forgiveness and peace, but also justice and shalom to the world. God created both body and soul, and the resurrection of Jesus shows that he is going to redeem both body and soul. The work of the Spirit of God is not only to save souls but also to care for and cultivate the face of the earth, the material world," Tim Keller (bold type added).
"If Jesus is the Creator-Lord, then by definition nothing could satisfy you like he can, even if you are successful. Even the most successful careers and families cannot give the significance, security, and affirmation that the author of glory and love can. … Jesus is the only Lord who, if you receive him, will fulfill you completely, and, if you fail him, will forgive you eternally." - Tim Keller
"For the Buddhist…personality is the fall of man, for the Christian it is the purpose of God, the whole point of his cosmic idea."
--G.K. Chesterton
"It is the purpose of God because he is essentially, eternally, interpersonal love. … God did not create us to get the cosmic, infinite joy of mutual love and glorification, but to share it. We were made to join in the dance. … We were designed, then, not just for belief in God in some general way, nor for a vague kind of inspiration or spirituality. … You were made for mutually self-giving, other-directed love. Self-centeredness destroys the fabric of what God has made."
--Tim Keller
"In self-giving, if anywhere, we touch a rhythm not only of all creation but of all being. For the Eternal Word also gives himself in sacrifice. When he was crucified, he 'did that in the wild weather of his outlying provinces which He had done at home in glory and gladness' from before the foundation of the world. … From the highest to the lowest exists to be abdicated and, by that abdication, it becomes more truly self, to be thereupon yet the more abdicated, and so forever. This is not a … law which we can escape. … What is outside the system of self-giving is … simply and solely Hell…that fierce imprisonment in the self. …Self-giving is absolute reality." - C.S. Lewis
"He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things is passed away." Revelation 21:4
"I would only believe in a god who could dance." -- Nietzsche
Questions
1. "If Jesus is the Creator-Lord, then by definition nothing could satisfy you like he can, even if you are successful. Even the most successful careers and families cannot give the significance, security, and affirmation that the author of glory and love can. … Jesus is the only Lord who, if you receive him, will fulfill you completely, and, if you fail him, will forgive you eternally," (Tim Keller). If you are not living for God's eternal love - what are you living for? Does it fulfill you completely?
2. Accepting Jesus' love is an all-or-nothing decision. A mild, half-hearted response fails to understand the full implications of who Christ claimed to be. Examine your motives; realize God is not a means to an end-He is the end. Are you using or trusting God? Do you want something from Him, or do you want Him? Are you surrendering some of you or all of you? Are you centering some of your life on Him, or all of it? If you have already accepted Jesus' love--how is He working through you right now, how is He using us (Redeemer) to restore genuine peace (shalom)-or are you just biding time until you can escape to Heaven?
3. Take inventory of your reservations and share them with others (including Christians at various stages of their journey) to get feedback-doubts, aspects of Christianity that bother you, perceived inconsistencies, fears about how it will affect your life. Which Christians do you know who would actually give ear to your reservations? If you do not attend Redeemer regularly, would you consider joining a home-group in which you could safely explore your reservations? Do you know anyone who may have reservations they need to share and explore-can you be the person they go to, will you introduce them to Christians you know who will also listen and explore?
The Truth...An Invitation to Dance / Jim Applegate
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truthan-invitation-to-dance.mp3
John 17:13-24
Key Thought: God's creation is an outpouring from the fullness of His love, and our part in creation is joining in that dance with Him and eachother.
Historical Context:
Jesus' prayer after the Last Supper, before His betrayal in the Garden of Gethsemane.
Sermon Points:
--God's plan as revealed in the Bible: a drama in four acts: creation, fall, redemption, restoration.
Act I: Creation
God's creation is an outpouring from the fullness of His love (essence of Trinity).
Act II: Fall
We fall away from God's perfect love every time our focus strays from Him.
Act III: Redemption
The Son of God was born into the world to put things right between us and God.
Act IV: Restoration
On earth as it is in Heaven. Glory to God in the highest goes with peace (shalom) on earth (rather than escaping it).
--The Christian Life:
1. Forgiveness is a means of salvation, but not the end or purpose of it.
2. God will use us, Christians (a.k.a. revolutionaries), to restore peace as we honor and glorify Him, serve eachother, and care for creation, naturally and artistically.
3. As our focus is centered on God, and as He uses us to restore peace (shalom), we live the Christian life assured of eventual success. How is God using you/church?
--Before Embarking on the Christian Journey:
1. Examine your motives; realize God is not a means to an end-He is the end.
2. Count the cost-this is an all-or-nothing choice (note U2 quote page 229-230). "God incarnate". This does not call for a "mild" response.
3. Take inventory of your reservations and share them with others (including Christians at various stages of their journey) to get feedback-doubts, aspects of Christianity that bother you, perceived inconsistencies, fears about how it will affect your life.
Joining the Dance:
1. Repent. "I'm a good person, I don't need salvation" is what we say when we have done good things to prove ourselves (meaning that people we judge not to be "good" are not "worthy")-we need to repent from that and everything else we've been relying on besides God's love, for our hope, security and significance.
2. Believe Jesus became human and sacrificed Himself for you on the cross and rose again, but don't just believe it intellectually-trust in Him. It doesn't matter if your trust starts out weak and small-what matters is Who you are trusting. He will strengthen and perfect your faith, teach you how to dance (brought you to the dance floor).
3. Put the first two into action and join His community (church).
Used these sources:
ch. 14-the dance of God (and epilogue)
Quotes
"The purpose of Jesus' coming is to put the whole world right, to renew and restore the creation, not to escape it. It is not just to bring personal forgiveness and peace, but also justice and shalom to the world. God created both body and soul, and the resurrection of Jesus shows that he is going to redeem both body and soul. The work of the Spirit of God is not only to save souls but also to care for and cultivate the face of the earth, the material world," Tim Keller (bold type added).
"If Jesus is the Creator-Lord, then by definition nothing could satisfy you like he can, even if you are successful. Even the most successful careers and families cannot give the significance, security, and affirmation that the author of glory and love can. … Jesus is the only Lord who, if you receive him, will fulfill you completely, and, if you fail him, will forgive you eternally." - Tim Keller
"For the Buddhist…personality is the fall of man, for the Christian it is the purpose of God, the whole point of his cosmic idea."
--G.K. Chesterton
"It is the purpose of God because he is essentially, eternally, interpersonal love. … God did not create us to get the cosmic, infinite joy of mutual love and glorification, but to share it. We were made to join in the dance. … We were designed, then, not just for belief in God in some general way, nor for a vague kind of inspiration or spirituality. … You were made for mutually self-giving, other-directed love. Self-centeredness destroys the fabric of what God has made."
--Tim Keller
"In self-giving, if anywhere, we touch a rhythm not only of all creation but of all being. For the Eternal Word also gives himself in sacrifice. When he was crucified, he 'did that in the wild weather of his outlying provinces which He had done at home in glory and gladness' from before the foundation of the world. … From the highest to the lowest exists to be abdicated and, by that abdication, it becomes more truly self, to be thereupon yet the more abdicated, and so forever. This is not a … law which we can escape. … What is outside the system of self-giving is … simply and solely Hell…that fierce imprisonment in the self. …Self-giving is absolute reality." - C.S. Lewis
"He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things is passed away." Revelation 21:4
"I would only believe in a god who could dance." -- Nietzsche
Questions
1. "If Jesus is the Creator-Lord, then by definition nothing could satisfy you like he can, even if you are successful. Even the most successful careers and families cannot give the significance, security, and affirmation that the author of glory and love can. … Jesus is the only Lord who, if you receive him, will fulfill you completely, and, if you fail him, will forgive you eternally," (Tim Keller). If you are not living for God's eternal love - what are you living for? Does it fulfill you completely?
2. Accepting Jesus' love is an all-or-nothing decision. A mild, half-hearted response fails to understand the full implications of who Christ claimed to be. Examine your motives; realize God is not a means to an end-He is the end. Are you using or trusting God? Do you want something from Him, or do you want Him? Are you surrendering some of you or all of you? Are you centering some of your life on Him, or all of it? If you have already accepted Jesus' love--how is He working through you right now, how is He using us (Redeemer) to restore genuine peace (shalom)-or are you just biding time until you can escape to Heaven?
3. Take inventory of your reservations and share them with others (including Christians at various stages of their journey) to get feedback-doubts, aspects of Christianity that bother you, perceived inconsistencies, fears about how it will affect your life. Which Christians do you know who would actually give ear to your reservations? If you do not attend Redeemer regularly, would you consider joining a home-group in which you could safely explore your reservations? Do you know anyone who may have reservations they need to share and explore-can you be the person they go to, will you introduce them to Christians you know who will also listen and explore?
The Truth...An Invitation to Dance / Jim Applegate
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truthan-invitation-to-dance.mp3
RFG sermon series ideas: The Problem
The Problem
John 6:26-58
Key Thought: Evil results from our choosing other than God, suffering draws us back to God, the Bread of Life which satisfies what the world can never satisfy.
Historical Context: Jesus is teaching to hunger for the eternal, not that which points to the eternal.
Sermon Points:
Doubt: A God that sends people to hell and allows evil and suffering cannot be considered good or loving, and believing in such a God results in guilt complexes and oppression.
1. Without Hell, there can be no Bread of Life. If there is no real good, then evil cannot be a problem. If we perceive evil is a problem-it implies there is (points to) a real good beyond nature, since nature has nothing to do with morality and selfless love (Dawkins' quote from previous sermon). Refer to question from first sermon (Is there anything you believe is wrong no matter what anybody thinks?). Either there is eternal good, we make good up, or there is no good (nihilism). What moral nihilists "think" they know contradicts what they "intuitively" know whenever they get truly offended-their behavior reflects an intuitive grasp of a real standard (the bread of life). Made-up good is not "true" good, and when we experience righteous indignation, we reflect an intuitive grasp that "this is really wrong-I did not make this up". It can't be "real" wrong unless there is "real" good-and that is God-the bread of life. Do you hunger for the bread of life?
2. Hell makes that Bread a choice. Without free will, love would be impossible; without the option of hell and the consequences of sin, love is not a choice. We are not sent to hell, the consequence of evil choices is not manufactured-we choose it, and like a loving father, God allows us to learn from our mistakes. Refer to previous weeks' discussion on living God's grace (religion, irreligion, gospel) and how that counters the guilt/oppression-choose grace. Additionally, without hell (that all evil will be brought to justice), the cycle of retaliation/oppression would never end-choose grace. Would God be good if He force-fed us love? Do you extend to others the grace and forgiveness God gives you?
3. We will be satisfied. It is important to know that not all pain and suffering is a consequence of sin. It can push us away from God or draw us to Him and strengthen us, teach us His love-despite-circumstances (the eternal despite that which passes away, v. 27), that we need Him ("poor in spirit"), that only He can satisfy such need--we hunger for that which exists or we would not hunger for it-the bread of life exists. Talk about God's no/yes from Acts, that only God knows how things will turn out and why they happened, and that we can find comfort in Him through every storm (pray and sing). He is going to redeem everything and justify everything we suffer through-all of our suffering will refine us like gold (1 Peter 1:7). He became human and endured the cross because our reconciliation is His joy (Heb 12:2). What do you place your hope in-what brings you through the furnace refined like gold, satisfied instead of destroyed?
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
ch. 9-the knowledge of God (moral sense)
Hell: Isn't the God of Christianity an angry Judge? Luke 16:19-31
This is covered in RFG ch. 5: How can a loving God send people to hell?
Suffering: If God is good, why is there so much evil in the world? 1 Peter 1:3-12
This is probably covered in RFG ch. 2: How could a good God allow suffering?
ch. 10-the problem of sin
Questions
1. If you agree that the "problem of evil" is a genuine problem for those who believe in a good God, then what is the source of 'good' from which this 'evil' departs? If there is no 'real' good-how can there be 'real' evil? If you think evil is a problem, perhaps that is a clue to your intuitive knowledge that there is a 'real' good: God (love). The real question is-what does a good, loving God 'do' about evil? Pick one: (1) prevent all suffering and prevent free will (to choose love), or (2) allow free will (to choose love) and allow all suffering.
2. "In short, hell is simply one's freely chosen identity apart from God on a trajectory into infinity" (Keller). It is not that God punishes you for all the stuff He knew you would do before you were even born - it is that God forgave you for it before you were even born - but He will not force love from you against your will, and so 'hell' must be a choice as well. What do you think about the thought that loss of belief in God's judgment leads to less inhibition (an opiate) to violence? Do you think God's judgment is in conflict with his love, or an expression of it?
3. Do you think there is no such thing as evil and suffering? "Is there anyone in the world right now doing things you believe they should stop doing no matter what they personally believe about the correctness of their behavior?" (Keller)
Quotes
"If one puts aside the existence of God and the survival after life as too doubtful…one has to make up one's mind as the the use of life. If death ends all, if I have neither to hope for good nor to fear evil, I must ask myself what I am here for, and how in these circumstances I must conduct myself. Now the answer is plain, but so unpalatable that most will not face it. There is no meaning for life, and [thus] life has no meaning." - Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up
"It was true, I had always realized it-I hadn't any 'right' to exist at all. I had appeared by chance, I existed like a stone, a plant, a microbe. I could feel nothing to myself but an inconsequential buzzing. I was thinking…that here we are eating and drinking, to preserve our precious existence, and that there's nothing, nothing, absolutely no reason for existing." - Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea
"Love anything, and your heart will certainly be wrung and possibly broken. If you want to make sure of keeping it intact, you must give your heart to no one, not even to an animal. Wrap it carefully round with hobbies and little luxuries; avoid all entanglements; lock it up safe in the casket or coffin of your selfishness. But in that casket-safe, dark, motionless, airless-it will change. It will not be broken; it will become unbreakable, impenetrable, irredeemable. The alternative to tragedy, or at least to the risk of tragedy, is damnation." - C.S Lewis
"God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go either wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having." - C.S. Lewis
"My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of 'just' and 'unjust'?...What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?...Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too-for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my private fancies. …Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple."
The Truth...Is it all good? / Lewis Wolfe
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truthis-it-all-good.mp3
John 6:26-58
Key Thought: Evil results from our choosing other than God, suffering draws us back to God, the Bread of Life which satisfies what the world can never satisfy.
Historical Context: Jesus is teaching to hunger for the eternal, not that which points to the eternal.
Sermon Points:
Doubt: A God that sends people to hell and allows evil and suffering cannot be considered good or loving, and believing in such a God results in guilt complexes and oppression.
1. Without Hell, there can be no Bread of Life. If there is no real good, then evil cannot be a problem. If we perceive evil is a problem-it implies there is (points to) a real good beyond nature, since nature has nothing to do with morality and selfless love (Dawkins' quote from previous sermon). Refer to question from first sermon (Is there anything you believe is wrong no matter what anybody thinks?). Either there is eternal good, we make good up, or there is no good (nihilism). What moral nihilists "think" they know contradicts what they "intuitively" know whenever they get truly offended-their behavior reflects an intuitive grasp of a real standard (the bread of life). Made-up good is not "true" good, and when we experience righteous indignation, we reflect an intuitive grasp that "this is really wrong-I did not make this up". It can't be "real" wrong unless there is "real" good-and that is God-the bread of life. Do you hunger for the bread of life?
2. Hell makes that Bread a choice. Without free will, love would be impossible; without the option of hell and the consequences of sin, love is not a choice. We are not sent to hell, the consequence of evil choices is not manufactured-we choose it, and like a loving father, God allows us to learn from our mistakes. Refer to previous weeks' discussion on living God's grace (religion, irreligion, gospel) and how that counters the guilt/oppression-choose grace. Additionally, without hell (that all evil will be brought to justice), the cycle of retaliation/oppression would never end-choose grace. Would God be good if He force-fed us love? Do you extend to others the grace and forgiveness God gives you?
3. We will be satisfied. It is important to know that not all pain and suffering is a consequence of sin. It can push us away from God or draw us to Him and strengthen us, teach us His love-despite-circumstances (the eternal despite that which passes away, v. 27), that we need Him ("poor in spirit"), that only He can satisfy such need--we hunger for that which exists or we would not hunger for it-the bread of life exists. Talk about God's no/yes from Acts, that only God knows how things will turn out and why they happened, and that we can find comfort in Him through every storm (pray and sing). He is going to redeem everything and justify everything we suffer through-all of our suffering will refine us like gold (1 Peter 1:7). He became human and endured the cross because our reconciliation is His joy (Heb 12:2). What do you place your hope in-what brings you through the furnace refined like gold, satisfied instead of destroyed?
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
ch. 9-the knowledge of God (moral sense)
Hell: Isn't the God of Christianity an angry Judge? Luke 16:19-31
This is covered in RFG ch. 5: How can a loving God send people to hell?
Suffering: If God is good, why is there so much evil in the world? 1 Peter 1:3-12
This is probably covered in RFG ch. 2: How could a good God allow suffering?
ch. 10-the problem of sin
Questions
1. If you agree that the "problem of evil" is a genuine problem for those who believe in a good God, then what is the source of 'good' from which this 'evil' departs? If there is no 'real' good-how can there be 'real' evil? If you think evil is a problem, perhaps that is a clue to your intuitive knowledge that there is a 'real' good: God (love). The real question is-what does a good, loving God 'do' about evil? Pick one: (1) prevent all suffering and prevent free will (to choose love), or (2) allow free will (to choose love) and allow all suffering.
2. "In short, hell is simply one's freely chosen identity apart from God on a trajectory into infinity" (Keller). It is not that God punishes you for all the stuff He knew you would do before you were even born - it is that God forgave you for it before you were even born - but He will not force love from you against your will, and so 'hell' must be a choice as well. What do you think about the thought that loss of belief in God's judgment leads to less inhibition (an opiate) to violence? Do you think God's judgment is in conflict with his love, or an expression of it?
3. Do you think there is no such thing as evil and suffering? "Is there anyone in the world right now doing things you believe they should stop doing no matter what they personally believe about the correctness of their behavior?" (Keller)
Quotes
"If one puts aside the existence of God and the survival after life as too doubtful…one has to make up one's mind as the the use of life. If death ends all, if I have neither to hope for good nor to fear evil, I must ask myself what I am here for, and how in these circumstances I must conduct myself. Now the answer is plain, but so unpalatable that most will not face it. There is no meaning for life, and [thus] life has no meaning." - Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up
"It was true, I had always realized it-I hadn't any 'right' to exist at all. I had appeared by chance, I existed like a stone, a plant, a microbe. I could feel nothing to myself but an inconsequential buzzing. I was thinking…that here we are eating and drinking, to preserve our precious existence, and that there's nothing, nothing, absolutely no reason for existing." - Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea
"Love anything, and your heart will certainly be wrung and possibly broken. If you want to make sure of keeping it intact, you must give your heart to no one, not even to an animal. Wrap it carefully round with hobbies and little luxuries; avoid all entanglements; lock it up safe in the casket or coffin of your selfishness. But in that casket-safe, dark, motionless, airless-it will change. It will not be broken; it will become unbreakable, impenetrable, irredeemable. The alternative to tragedy, or at least to the risk of tragedy, is damnation." - C.S Lewis
"God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go either wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having." - C.S. Lewis
"My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of 'just' and 'unjust'?...What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?...Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too-for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my private fancies. …Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple."
The Truth...Is it all good? / Lewis Wolfe
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truthis-it-all-good.mp3
RFG sermon series ideas: Faith, Reason and the Clues of God
Faith, Reason and the Clues of God
Sermon Passage: Luke 24:33-42
Multi-media Ideas: Nacho Libre clip on religion/science would be good at beginning, Beautiful Mind marriage proposal clip would be good to wrap it up. Hand-out with "clues" would be good.
Key Thought: Even with conclusive evidence, faith is still required.
Historical Context: Love makes Himself evident in the upper room.
Sermon Points:
Doubt: Don't faith and science conflict?
1. Faith is reasonable, and reason cannot attain certainty. Only an omniscient being knows things for certain-all other knowledge, even scientific knowledge, is varying degrees of faith, depending on the strength of the evidence. Science cannot rule out faith assumptions which do not conflict with scientific evidence. Blind faith is not in the Bible, and if we divorce reason from faith, we get people who "drink the Kool Aid" and will believe in anything. One reason people don't take Christians seriously is because some Christians believe things which clash with science. There are many scientists who are Christians (Dr. Francis Collins, head of Human Genome Project) who believe God can create slowly, that the Bible's account of creation is poetic, and that this does not affect the fundamentals of our faith. Even so, naturalists try to say miracles like the resurrection are impossible, because what happens in nature is always "natural" or it could not happen in nature (resurrection is natural, while also supernatural). Scientists agree there was a beginning to nature (even cyclic model theorists), and if they conclude nature "just happened"-that conclusion is a matter of faith. But just because we have faith (based on good evidence) that something exists-does not mean we put faith "in" it (trust it)-trust (rather than blind faith, or faith without evidence) is the faith the Bible talks about-it is not 'enough' to just believe God exists, we need to trust Him with our lives. But first we need good evidence. You wouldn't put trust in your wife if you didn't have good reasons supporting her existence. Impossible to prove a belief (as strong rationalism requires) but beliefs can be evaluated to be more reasonable than others, though still rationally avoidable (the task of critical rationalism). The theory of God's existence and interaction explains the things we observe more than any alternative theory. Do you think your faith is not genuine unless it is blind?
2. Reasons. We already covered the mysterious beginning of nature (clue 1). See clues 2-5 and use whichever ones you feel comfortable explaining, or others not listed. At least mention that there are more "clues" out there that "add up"-maybe post them on website and refer to it, or put it in hand-out. Also consider this quote from Dawkins' "Out of Eden" -- "In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at the bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no other god. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music," [Richard Dawkins, "Out of Eden" (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 133.] This supports the idea that universal moral truth cannot be grounded in nature and that our natural moral sense that there is truly right and truly wrong (question from first sermon) is a pointer to God. Kierkegaard would say to trust our moral sense, that love is the point, that God is love-because to doubt this evidence is to be like the Jews in Jesus' time who, after seeing miracles, asked for more signs because they did not trust what they were pointing to-like doubting your lover and putting faith in the alternative. Even so, He does not leave us without evidence. Do you have faith that the point of life is God's love, or do you have faith that it isn't? We will continue to talk more about this in the coming weeks.
3. Faith. The faith the Bible talks about is belief in, not just belief that (assurance of promises we hope for, but do not yet see; confidence in the evidence behind the promise, rather than doubting the promise despite the evidence) (or loyalty and trust rather than disloyalty and distrust). But love is not love without demonstration (evidence)-and so He became human and sacrificed Himself for us. Refer back to passage -- some doubted what they saw with their eyes and touched with their hands…the miraculous isn't something just we modern folk struggle with… the apostles all ended up as great leaders in the church, though some had a lot more trouble believing than others. Keller: "We modern people think of miracles as the suspension of the natural order, but Jesus meant them to be the restoration of the natural order. … His miracles are not just proofs that he has power but also wonderful foretastes of what he is going to do with that power. Jesus' miracles are not just a challenge to our minds, but a promise to our hearts, that the world we all want is coming." Unless, of course, we think of the natural world the way the Gnostics did, and totally miss the beauty of creation. Important not to forget: the sign is not what is important - what the sign points to is important. If it points away from God, no matter how miraculous, it's a false sign-don't put your faith there. Deuteronomy 13:1-4, Matthew 6:21-23. We are not done talking about evidence in this series, we've merely gotten started. But it doesn't matter how much evidence we have of God's existence, doesn't matter how many miracles we see-the faith God wants from us is trust, love, not mere intellectual assent. (A Beautiful Mind marriage proposal clip would be cool.) Do you put faith "in" God, do you go beyond mere intellectual assent and trust Him with your life?
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
Doubt: What should I do with my doubts? John 20:1-18
Dealt with in intermission.
Ch. 6-science has disproved Christianity (faith and reason do not contradict) (GOOD DISCUSSION POTENTIAL)
ch. 8-the clues of God (IMPORTANT)
Questions
1. Do you agree that the faith spoken about in the Bible is not blind faith? Do you agree that Biblical faith is trust in the evidence, trust in God, the same sort of trust we display when we say "I do"? Do you give mere intellectual assent to the evidence of God, or do you also trust Him with your heart?
2. What do you think about the fact that it is impossible to prove anything for certain, that what we must do is weigh the reasonableness of competing beliefs? Have you identified and examined the faith assumptions masked by your doubts? Have you fully given the evidence, the clues for God's existence, a fair examination? Is your faith in your doubts greater than your faith in the evidence for God's existence?
3. "Is there anyone in the world right now doing things you believe they should stop doing no matter what they personally believe about the correctness of their behavior?" (Keller). If morality is objectively real, if social justice is never relative, what is its unchanging foundation? Have you ever felt "there must be more" when in the presence of natural beauty? Do you have faith that the point of life is God's love, or do you have faith that there is no point-or, if there is a point, and it isn't grounded in eternal God…how is it "the" point?
Quotes
"[ Swinburne says that ] the view that there is a God…leads us to expect the things we observe-that there is a universe at all, that scientific laws operate within it, that it contains human beings with consciousnesses and with an indelible moral sense. The theory that there is no God…does not lead us to expect any of these things. Therefore, belief in God offers a better empirical fit, it explains and accounts for what we see better than the alternative account of things." - Tim Keller
"Come, let us argue it out," (God through Isaiah 1:18).
"We may, therefore, be secular materialists who believe truth and justice, good and evil, are complete illusions. But in the presence of art or even great natural beauty, our hearts tell us another story. … regardless of the beliefs of our mind about the random meaninglessness of life, before the face of beauty we know better. … Isn't it true that innate desires correspond to real objects that can satisfy them? … Doesn't the unfulfillable longing evoked by beauty qualify as an innate desire? We have a longing for joy, love, and beauty that no amount or quality of food, sex, friendship, or success can satisfy. We want something that nothing in this world can fulfill," (134-135).
"In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at the bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no other god. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music," [Richard Dawkins, "Out of Eden" (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 133.]
"We modern people think of miracles as the suspension of the natural order, but Jesus meant them to be the restoration of the natural order. … His miracles are not just proofs that he has power but also wonderful foretastes of what he is going to do with that power. Jesus' miracles are not just a challenge to our minds, but a promise to our hearts, that the world we all want is coming."
The Truth...A Leap? / Jim Applegate
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/faith-built-on-evidence.mp3
Sermon Passage: Luke 24:33-42
Multi-media Ideas: Nacho Libre clip on religion/science would be good at beginning, Beautiful Mind marriage proposal clip would be good to wrap it up. Hand-out with "clues" would be good.
Key Thought: Even with conclusive evidence, faith is still required.
Historical Context: Love makes Himself evident in the upper room.
Sermon Points:
Doubt: Don't faith and science conflict?
1. Faith is reasonable, and reason cannot attain certainty. Only an omniscient being knows things for certain-all other knowledge, even scientific knowledge, is varying degrees of faith, depending on the strength of the evidence. Science cannot rule out faith assumptions which do not conflict with scientific evidence. Blind faith is not in the Bible, and if we divorce reason from faith, we get people who "drink the Kool Aid" and will believe in anything. One reason people don't take Christians seriously is because some Christians believe things which clash with science. There are many scientists who are Christians (Dr. Francis Collins, head of Human Genome Project) who believe God can create slowly, that the Bible's account of creation is poetic, and that this does not affect the fundamentals of our faith. Even so, naturalists try to say miracles like the resurrection are impossible, because what happens in nature is always "natural" or it could not happen in nature (resurrection is natural, while also supernatural). Scientists agree there was a beginning to nature (even cyclic model theorists), and if they conclude nature "just happened"-that conclusion is a matter of faith. But just because we have faith (based on good evidence) that something exists-does not mean we put faith "in" it (trust it)-trust (rather than blind faith, or faith without evidence) is the faith the Bible talks about-it is not 'enough' to just believe God exists, we need to trust Him with our lives. But first we need good evidence. You wouldn't put trust in your wife if you didn't have good reasons supporting her existence. Impossible to prove a belief (as strong rationalism requires) but beliefs can be evaluated to be more reasonable than others, though still rationally avoidable (the task of critical rationalism). The theory of God's existence and interaction explains the things we observe more than any alternative theory. Do you think your faith is not genuine unless it is blind?
2. Reasons. We already covered the mysterious beginning of nature (clue 1). See clues 2-5 and use whichever ones you feel comfortable explaining, or others not listed. At least mention that there are more "clues" out there that "add up"-maybe post them on website and refer to it, or put it in hand-out. Also consider this quote from Dawkins' "Out of Eden" -- "In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at the bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no other god. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music," [Richard Dawkins, "Out of Eden" (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 133.] This supports the idea that universal moral truth cannot be grounded in nature and that our natural moral sense that there is truly right and truly wrong (question from first sermon) is a pointer to God. Kierkegaard would say to trust our moral sense, that love is the point, that God is love-because to doubt this evidence is to be like the Jews in Jesus' time who, after seeing miracles, asked for more signs because they did not trust what they were pointing to-like doubting your lover and putting faith in the alternative. Even so, He does not leave us without evidence. Do you have faith that the point of life is God's love, or do you have faith that it isn't? We will continue to talk more about this in the coming weeks.
3. Faith. The faith the Bible talks about is belief in, not just belief that (assurance of promises we hope for, but do not yet see; confidence in the evidence behind the promise, rather than doubting the promise despite the evidence) (or loyalty and trust rather than disloyalty and distrust). But love is not love without demonstration (evidence)-and so He became human and sacrificed Himself for us. Refer back to passage -- some doubted what they saw with their eyes and touched with their hands…the miraculous isn't something just we modern folk struggle with… the apostles all ended up as great leaders in the church, though some had a lot more trouble believing than others. Keller: "We modern people think of miracles as the suspension of the natural order, but Jesus meant them to be the restoration of the natural order. … His miracles are not just proofs that he has power but also wonderful foretastes of what he is going to do with that power. Jesus' miracles are not just a challenge to our minds, but a promise to our hearts, that the world we all want is coming." Unless, of course, we think of the natural world the way the Gnostics did, and totally miss the beauty of creation. Important not to forget: the sign is not what is important - what the sign points to is important. If it points away from God, no matter how miraculous, it's a false sign-don't put your faith there. Deuteronomy 13:1-4, Matthew 6:21-23. We are not done talking about evidence in this series, we've merely gotten started. But it doesn't matter how much evidence we have of God's existence, doesn't matter how many miracles we see-the faith God wants from us is trust, love, not mere intellectual assent. (A Beautiful Mind marriage proposal clip would be cool.) Do you put faith "in" God, do you go beyond mere intellectual assent and trust Him with your life?
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
Doubt: What should I do with my doubts? John 20:1-18
Dealt with in intermission.
Ch. 6-science has disproved Christianity (faith and reason do not contradict) (GOOD DISCUSSION POTENTIAL)
ch. 8-the clues of God (IMPORTANT)
Questions
1. Do you agree that the faith spoken about in the Bible is not blind faith? Do you agree that Biblical faith is trust in the evidence, trust in God, the same sort of trust we display when we say "I do"? Do you give mere intellectual assent to the evidence of God, or do you also trust Him with your heart?
2. What do you think about the fact that it is impossible to prove anything for certain, that what we must do is weigh the reasonableness of competing beliefs? Have you identified and examined the faith assumptions masked by your doubts? Have you fully given the evidence, the clues for God's existence, a fair examination? Is your faith in your doubts greater than your faith in the evidence for God's existence?
3. "Is there anyone in the world right now doing things you believe they should stop doing no matter what they personally believe about the correctness of their behavior?" (Keller). If morality is objectively real, if social justice is never relative, what is its unchanging foundation? Have you ever felt "there must be more" when in the presence of natural beauty? Do you have faith that the point of life is God's love, or do you have faith that there is no point-or, if there is a point, and it isn't grounded in eternal God…how is it "the" point?
Quotes
"[ Swinburne says that ] the view that there is a God…leads us to expect the things we observe-that there is a universe at all, that scientific laws operate within it, that it contains human beings with consciousnesses and with an indelible moral sense. The theory that there is no God…does not lead us to expect any of these things. Therefore, belief in God offers a better empirical fit, it explains and accounts for what we see better than the alternative account of things." - Tim Keller
"Come, let us argue it out," (God through Isaiah 1:18).
"We may, therefore, be secular materialists who believe truth and justice, good and evil, are complete illusions. But in the presence of art or even great natural beauty, our hearts tell us another story. … regardless of the beliefs of our mind about the random meaninglessness of life, before the face of beauty we know better. … Isn't it true that innate desires correspond to real objects that can satisfy them? … Doesn't the unfulfillable longing evoked by beauty qualify as an innate desire? We have a longing for joy, love, and beauty that no amount or quality of food, sex, friendship, or success can satisfy. We want something that nothing in this world can fulfill," (134-135).
"In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at the bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no other god. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music," [Richard Dawkins, "Out of Eden" (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 133.]
"We modern people think of miracles as the suspension of the natural order, but Jesus meant them to be the restoration of the natural order. … His miracles are not just proofs that he has power but also wonderful foretastes of what he is going to do with that power. Jesus' miracles are not just a challenge to our minds, but a promise to our hearts, that the world we all want is coming."
The Truth...A Leap? / Jim Applegate
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/faith-built-on-evidence.mp3
RFG sermon series ideas: Speak the Truth in Love
Speak the Truth in Love
James 2:1-17
Key Thought: Speak the truth in love-and live it.
Historical Context: James calls for faith in action, which is love in action.
Sermon Points:
Doubt: The Christian church has (agreed) a long history of oppression and hypocrisy, of disempowering the poor, of being "the opiate of the masses" (Marx).
1. "Has God not chosen the poor?" (James) Word translated as 'mercy' means 'meeting the physical needs of the poor'. Good Samaritan-'the one who did mercy.' "Have mercy on us" means "heal me". MLK Jr.-when he confronted Christian clergymen, did he say "let's get away from Christianity"?-"Christianity is the opiate of the masses"? No, he said, let's return, get to the heart of the Christian faith. Two ways of rebelling against God: 1. act like you have no shame and everyone else are squares, 2. look down your nose as a fine, upstanding citizen. Both need God's grace, but the ones who see it are those who are fed up with themselves, who are not comfortable with where they are at-the poor in spirit. Are you looking down on the squares, do you look the other way or blame the downtrodden when faced with human tragedy, or are you poor in spirit, chosen of God?
2. "Judgment will be w/o mercy for those who have shown no mercy." That Christians did not become perfect upon conversion (justification) proves only that they still need Him after conversion (sanctification) (church like hospital full of sick people seeking help)-it doesn't knock down Christianity, but the world's charge of hypocrisy should knock us down to our knees. Are we numbed to inaction in the face of the real problems of the world, is our faith blind? Are we salt w/ no more taste? Are we lukewarm? Are we getting in arguments that do not reflect God's love and therefore misrepresent Him to the world (Matthew 21:31)? "Faith without works" (evidence, not means, of salvation) "is dead" (contrast from last week's v.16). Is your dead faith part of the problem the world has with so-called Christians?
3. "as believers" Speak and live the truth in love. The last point was hard to hear, hard for me to deliver, but don't lose heart-let God break it, give it to Him, become poor in spirit. Live in God's grace, connected to the vine, Abba, Father, apart from which we wither. Use what you learn about how to defend your faith in this series to open up dialogue, but use it with love, and let God love through you. Radical reformission. Witness where you are, without being a jerk (say something against "God hates fags"). Talk about CHE and the Faith and Works ministry, etcetera (we are at a prime, down-town location for this). Talk about encouraging eachother to good works in our home groups, getting connected if we haven't yet. Do you care about what's going on in the world, get involved to restore and redeem, build the Kingdom? Are you someone the church needs to reach out to?-ask.
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
Injustice: Hasn't Christianity been an instrument for oppression? James 2:1-17
This is covered in RFG ch. 4: The church is responsible for so much
--would be a good place to talk about not treating evangelism like mortal combat...to talk about "radical reformission" and church-planting
Rev. King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" for your perusal:
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf
Group Discussion Questions:
1. Have you felt that maybe Christianity is false because of Christians you knew or know who did not act like "good Christians"? Can a loving God exist and be worthy of worship, even if those who claim to love Him do not love others or come off as self-righteous fanatics?
2. If Christianity is false-if Jesus did not show us that God loves us no matter what-how can a world devoid of the Gospel, of a loving God, be motivated to humble peacemaking? Can love be "always" right if the eternal lacks personhood?
3. What does it mean to you to be a "good Christian"? Do you feel you are less of a hypocrite than some Christians you know and are therefore better than them? What do you think about grace being impossible to deserve, and how should it influence how we relate with others? Would those who know you, say that you extend Christ's love and forgiveness to them? Do you feel better than others because of your good works?
The Truth...That's Love? / Gareth Flora
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truth-thats-love.mp3
James 2:1-17
Key Thought: Speak the truth in love-and live it.
Historical Context: James calls for faith in action, which is love in action.
Sermon Points:
Doubt: The Christian church has (agreed) a long history of oppression and hypocrisy, of disempowering the poor, of being "the opiate of the masses" (Marx).
1. "Has God not chosen the poor?" (James) Word translated as 'mercy' means 'meeting the physical needs of the poor'. Good Samaritan-'the one who did mercy.' "Have mercy on us" means "heal me". MLK Jr.-when he confronted Christian clergymen, did he say "let's get away from Christianity"?-"Christianity is the opiate of the masses"? No, he said, let's return, get to the heart of the Christian faith. Two ways of rebelling against God: 1. act like you have no shame and everyone else are squares, 2. look down your nose as a fine, upstanding citizen. Both need God's grace, but the ones who see it are those who are fed up with themselves, who are not comfortable with where they are at-the poor in spirit. Are you looking down on the squares, do you look the other way or blame the downtrodden when faced with human tragedy, or are you poor in spirit, chosen of God?
2. "Judgment will be w/o mercy for those who have shown no mercy." That Christians did not become perfect upon conversion (justification) proves only that they still need Him after conversion (sanctification) (church like hospital full of sick people seeking help)-it doesn't knock down Christianity, but the world's charge of hypocrisy should knock us down to our knees. Are we numbed to inaction in the face of the real problems of the world, is our faith blind? Are we salt w/ no more taste? Are we lukewarm? Are we getting in arguments that do not reflect God's love and therefore misrepresent Him to the world (Matthew 21:31)? "Faith without works" (evidence, not means, of salvation) "is dead" (contrast from last week's v.16). Is your dead faith part of the problem the world has with so-called Christians?
3. "as believers" Speak and live the truth in love. The last point was hard to hear, hard for me to deliver, but don't lose heart-let God break it, give it to Him, become poor in spirit. Live in God's grace, connected to the vine, Abba, Father, apart from which we wither. Use what you learn about how to defend your faith in this series to open up dialogue, but use it with love, and let God love through you. Radical reformission. Witness where you are, without being a jerk (say something against "God hates fags"). Talk about CHE and the Faith and Works ministry, etcetera (we are at a prime, down-town location for this). Talk about encouraging eachother to good works in our home groups, getting connected if we haven't yet. Do you care about what's going on in the world, get involved to restore and redeem, build the Kingdom? Are you someone the church needs to reach out to?-ask.
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
Injustice: Hasn't Christianity been an instrument for oppression? James 2:1-17
This is covered in RFG ch. 4: The church is responsible for so much
--would be a good place to talk about not treating evangelism like mortal combat...to talk about "radical reformission" and church-planting
Rev. King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" for your perusal:
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf
Group Discussion Questions:
1. Have you felt that maybe Christianity is false because of Christians you knew or know who did not act like "good Christians"? Can a loving God exist and be worthy of worship, even if those who claim to love Him do not love others or come off as self-righteous fanatics?
2. If Christianity is false-if Jesus did not show us that God loves us no matter what-how can a world devoid of the Gospel, of a loving God, be motivated to humble peacemaking? Can love be "always" right if the eternal lacks personhood?
3. What does it mean to you to be a "good Christian"? Do you feel you are less of a hypocrite than some Christians you know and are therefore better than them? What do you think about grace being impossible to deserve, and how should it influence how we relate with others? Would those who know you, say that you extend Christ's love and forgiveness to them? Do you feel better than others because of your good works?
The Truth...That's Love? / Gareth Flora
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truth-thats-love.mp3
RFG sermon series ideas: The Truth--Why?
The Truth-Why?
Galatians 2:4-16
Key Thought: The truth will set you free.
Historical Context:
· Council at Jerusalem-Paul confronts Peter for wanting to please the Judaizers and corrupting the truth of the Gospel by excluding Gentiles
Sermon Points:
Doubt: A claim to absolute truth is arrogant, religion is oppressive when not kept a private matter, and even then it restricts the religious individual.
1. v. 14 Everyone believes something to the exclusion of other beliefs. Example: Is there anything you believe is wrong no matter what anybody thinks? Even if they are tolerant of others having different beliefs, that doesn't translate into a loving society (the Greco-Roman world). To doubt a belief is to exclude it and put faith in something else-to doubt 'all' beliefs is a self-contradictory belief. To doubt love is the point is to exclude it and faithfully believe there is no point. That will be the compass upon which you base all your decisions, not just private ones-religion (faith) cannot just be kept private. Do you examine the beliefs driving you & your doubts? Do you know the Bible never calls us to have blind faith?--In a few weeks.
2. v. 15 So, given everyone puts faith in something and it is illogical to accept all beliefs if they contradict eachother, the question becomes "Which beliefs will empower us to be agents of reconciliation and peace in the world?" Granted, those beliefs must correspond to reality, we can't just make up a new religion and call it truth, which is why in a few weeks we will discuss evidence that supports Christianity. But when we're talking about empowerment and reconciliation, Christianity is distinct from all religions because a) most other religions want to escape this world but Christ redeems and restores it, b) the meaning of life is to live God's grace, not earn it (karma), and c) God became our example of reconciliation in Christ (religion based in ultimate reality), whereas all other religious founders are only human. Do the beliefs driving your doubts empower and lead to reconciliation? The church has a bad track record, talk about more next week.
3. v. 10 Christ, our example, gave up divine power and became human and died for us, He gave up everything to show us the absolute truth about His love-the only thing that sets us free, like staying in water liberates the fish, the only thing that truly satisfies and answers the inner "WHY?" All other truth-substitutes lead to slavery, addiction. Christians included everybody from the beginning (Gal 3:28), in a culture when exclusion was the norm (although they were religiously inclusive). Jesus on the cross loved people who didn't love Him-died for His enemies-that's ultimate reality, and the early church lived it. Religious moralists feel superior to secularists, who feel superior to all the stupid religious people. But, if you accept the Gospel, you know you didn't deserve it, you want others to enjoy in it, and you confidently know your life is built on ultimate reality-you become part of what the world needs. Does your "Hope" drive you to become what this world needs?
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
Exclusivity: How can there be just one true religion? 1 John 4:1-10
This is probably covered in RFG ch. 1: There can't be just one true religion.
Absolutism: Don't we all have to find truth for ourselves? Galatians 2:4-16
This is probably covered in RFG ch. 3: Christianity is a Straightjacket.
ch. 11-religion and the gospel
Intro.
Group Discussion Questions:
1. Do you have any doubts or barriers to your faith? If you doubt a certain belief-what alternative belief does it imply? Do you equally examine that alternative belief?
2. If you doubt the existence of God, do you fully examine the alternative belief that there is no real 'good'? "Is there anyone in the world right now doing things you believe they should stop doing no matter what they personally believe about the correctness of their behavior?" (Keller). If morality is objectively real, if social justice is never relative, what is its unchanging foundation?
3. Does your worldview promote humble, peace-loving behavior, and, if so, how? Does yours base a man's worth on his good deeds ('religion'), or on God's unearned love demonstrated on the cross? ('Gospel') - or does man have no worth in yours ('irreligion')? Is the 'irreligious' worldview 'implicitly' religious-an unprovable faith assumption?
The Truth...I'm Skeptical / Paul VK
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truthim-skeptical.mp3
Galatians 2:4-16
Key Thought: The truth will set you free.
Historical Context:
· Council at Jerusalem-Paul confronts Peter for wanting to please the Judaizers and corrupting the truth of the Gospel by excluding Gentiles
Sermon Points:
Doubt: A claim to absolute truth is arrogant, religion is oppressive when not kept a private matter, and even then it restricts the religious individual.
1. v. 14 Everyone believes something to the exclusion of other beliefs. Example: Is there anything you believe is wrong no matter what anybody thinks? Even if they are tolerant of others having different beliefs, that doesn't translate into a loving society (the Greco-Roman world). To doubt a belief is to exclude it and put faith in something else-to doubt 'all' beliefs is a self-contradictory belief. To doubt love is the point is to exclude it and faithfully believe there is no point. That will be the compass upon which you base all your decisions, not just private ones-religion (faith) cannot just be kept private. Do you examine the beliefs driving you & your doubts? Do you know the Bible never calls us to have blind faith?--In a few weeks.
2. v. 15 So, given everyone puts faith in something and it is illogical to accept all beliefs if they contradict eachother, the question becomes "Which beliefs will empower us to be agents of reconciliation and peace in the world?" Granted, those beliefs must correspond to reality, we can't just make up a new religion and call it truth, which is why in a few weeks we will discuss evidence that supports Christianity. But when we're talking about empowerment and reconciliation, Christianity is distinct from all religions because a) most other religions want to escape this world but Christ redeems and restores it, b) the meaning of life is to live God's grace, not earn it (karma), and c) God became our example of reconciliation in Christ (religion based in ultimate reality), whereas all other religious founders are only human. Do the beliefs driving your doubts empower and lead to reconciliation? The church has a bad track record, talk about more next week.
3. v. 10 Christ, our example, gave up divine power and became human and died for us, He gave up everything to show us the absolute truth about His love-the only thing that sets us free, like staying in water liberates the fish, the only thing that truly satisfies and answers the inner "WHY?" All other truth-substitutes lead to slavery, addiction. Christians included everybody from the beginning (Gal 3:28), in a culture when exclusion was the norm (although they were religiously inclusive). Jesus on the cross loved people who didn't love Him-died for His enemies-that's ultimate reality, and the early church lived it. Religious moralists feel superior to secularists, who feel superior to all the stupid religious people. But, if you accept the Gospel, you know you didn't deserve it, you want others to enjoy in it, and you confidently know your life is built on ultimate reality-you become part of what the world needs. Does your "Hope" drive you to become what this world needs?
Used these sources:
http://www.reasonforgod.com/media.php
Exclusivity: How can there be just one true religion? 1 John 4:1-10
This is probably covered in RFG ch. 1: There can't be just one true religion.
Absolutism: Don't we all have to find truth for ourselves? Galatians 2:4-16
This is probably covered in RFG ch. 3: Christianity is a Straightjacket.
ch. 11-religion and the gospel
Intro.
Group Discussion Questions:
1. Do you have any doubts or barriers to your faith? If you doubt a certain belief-what alternative belief does it imply? Do you equally examine that alternative belief?
2. If you doubt the existence of God, do you fully examine the alternative belief that there is no real 'good'? "Is there anyone in the world right now doing things you believe they should stop doing no matter what they personally believe about the correctness of their behavior?" (Keller). If morality is objectively real, if social justice is never relative, what is its unchanging foundation?
3. Does your worldview promote humble, peace-loving behavior, and, if so, how? Does yours base a man's worth on his good deeds ('religion'), or on God's unearned love demonstrated on the cross? ('Gospel') - or does man have no worth in yours ('irreligion')? Is the 'irreligious' worldview 'implicitly' religious-an unprovable faith assumption?
The Truth...I'm Skeptical / Paul VK
http://www.theredeemerchurch.com/js/audio-player.php?audio=http://s3.amazonaws.com/churchplantmedia-cms/redeemercommunitymodestoca/the-truthim-skeptical.mp3
Monday, August 10, 2009
Norris' "Epistemology" Ch3.IV2-V: Derrida
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris' "Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy"
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section IV, Part 2-Section V. Derrida.
Section IV, Part 2
"There is plentiful evidence in the writings of Jacques Derrida-especially his early work on Husserl and his Bachelard-influenced analyses of metaphor in the texts of philosophy-that Derridean deconstruction inherits something of the same epistemo-critical agenda. At any rate, it stands well apart from those other movements in recent French though (post-structuralism, postmodernism, and the Foucauldian 'genealogy' of knowledge) that adopts a highly skeptical approach to such issues."
1. "presses hard on various antimonies in Husserl's project-chief among them that of 'genesis' and 'structure'--…with the utmost analytic rigour and with a keen sense of their taking rise from deep-laid yet conflicting necessities of thought which cannot be put down to mere confusion or failure of conceptual grasp."
2. "instances the 'undecidability' of certain propositions with regard to the role of the metaphor in philosophical discourse, this term is not deployed in a loose or ad hoc way (='vagueness', 'ambiguity', etc.) but specifically with reference to Gödel's proof that any formal system complex enough to generate the axioms of elementary arithmetic will contain at least one theorem that cannot be proved within the system itself."
3. Pursues "with no less rigour and tenacity" "the 'logic of supplementarity'" that he "finds everywhere at work in the texts of Rousseau and others" "for its contravening certain classical axioms, i.e., those of bivalence and excluded middle."
There is widespread antipathy to Derrida's work (just wiki Derrida for reasons)-Norris thinks it is mostly due to ignorance of all the background to Derrida's thought. Derrida (and Norris, as we'll soon see) disagrees with the 'analytic' tradition, that we can approach an issue without consulting earlier thought. On the one hand, I think if we have all the tools of previous thinkers, we don't need to read everything they did to arrive at those tools in order to use them. On the other hand-if we want to speak their language, we have to use the terminology with which they are familiar-and to do that, we must read them. Hence, this book discussion…which makes me feel like I've merely chipped the tip of the iceberg. Only by reading folks can you find out where they got stuck, and be able to explain how to get unstuck. Only by reading folks can you save your efforts for work that is left to be done, and avoid reinventing the wheel or repeating the same old mistakes of past thinkers ("conjured away through a Wittgensteinian 'therapeutic' approach that most often leaves them firmly in place")-which is what allowed cultural relativism to creep in.
Section V.
But at last there are signs that folks in the analytic camp are taking another look at issues addressed by post-Kantian epistemological thought, like "the question whether issues of knowledge come down to issues of first-hand epistemic warrant. …the question which divided Neurath and Schlick in the debates around 'old-style' 1930s logical positivism, namely their disagreement as to how far scientific truth-claims could be cashed out in terms of a phenomenalist (sense-datum) language which nevertheless eschewed any recourse to 'subjectivist' or 'psychologistic' modes of thought."
This question still preoccupies recent analytical thinkers-refer back to John McDowell-but suggestions first proposed by Kant are often advanced as if nothing had happened on the continental side ("from Fichte and Schelling, via Hegel, down to Husserl") since then-or that it "represented nothing more than a local aberration from reputable standards of truth, rationality or commonsense warrant. "The problems with McDowell's revisionist reading of Kant-his strenuous attempt to dismount from the 'seesaw' of logical empiricism-are exactly those which first came to view in the quarrel between Fichte's subjective idealism (his idea of the world-constituting Ego) and Schelling's all-encompassing conception of nature as the ultimate source and ground of knowledge." And folks try to appropriate Hegel's work w/o considering "its fortunes in that other (mainland-European) tradition" (Norris says that a lot…maybe he just gets tired of saying 'continental'…wants to mix it up a bit). They have ignored treatment of the issues by 'continental' thinkers from Husserl to Derrida.
Influenced by Wittgenstein, they invoke a naturalized Kant as if the problems which necessarily arise from this are "pseudo-problems that result from our chronic 'bewitchment of language'". But, "they are problems which necessarily arise for any project of thought that attempts to resolve the classic antinomy between truth as a matter of 'absolute ideal objectivity' and truth as lying within the compass of attainable human knowledge." Hmm…maybe I still need to revise my '1', '2' thing from the last two sections? Lol. Oy vey.
The following is updated and corrected in my "starting point" thread.
1. Certain, mind-independent truth (ontology) histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history-hypotheses which have 'transcended the metaphor') 'context of justification'--'absolute ideal objectivity'-omniscience (which, granted, requires mind-but 'facts' are not dependent on that mind for their truth-kind of like how God "is" good, rather than "making" good exist).
2. Uncertain knowledge, belief (epistemology) 'context of discovery'
--Genesis: "process of reasoning by which such truths [structure] are arrived at"-"the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought"--Structure: "distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic"-truth, knowledge, epistemic warrant… (can arrive at truth, but not at omniscience)histoire perimée (lapsed history) - applies to those theories which don't pass muster
[When we come to believe what is true, then 1 and 2 come together (except for that which lapses). All we need to bring 1 and 2 together is a standard for distinguishing true from false-and minds who use the standard. The only being who doesn't need to "use" the standard is an omniscient being, who does not "come to believe"-but eternally knows.]
This is the issue Derrida deals with when he "pursues the antinomy between 'structure' and 'genesis' which results from Husserl's attempt to explain the possibility of objective mathematical truths as somehow resulting from a sequence of discoveries with their own historical and culture-specific conditions of emergence. Thus he shows that Husserl's entire project is riven by these two contradictory imperatives, i.e., the requirement that geometry should on the one hand be conceived as possessing a character of timeless, eternal, a priori truth, while on the other it involves the 'reactivation' of certain cardinal insights that have made up the history of geometrical thought from Euclid to the present day. In particular Derrida brings out the problems that result from any striving to secure the apriority claim when confronted with developments-such as non-Euclidean geometry-which would seem to place large obstacles in its way." What's cool about Derrida is he approached these issues with respect to Husserl's "exemplary rigour" and "the points at which phenomenology runs up against constitutive problems or aporias in its own undertaking."
How to reconcile objectivist verification-transcendent mathematical truth with epistemic accounts which bring truth within reason's grasp, as see in chapter 2, is a main topic of debate for analytic philosophers-and Derrida "takes due stock of the well-known exchange between Husserl and Frege on the status of truths in the formal sciences and the strict necessity-as Frege saw it-to redeem such 'absolute ideal objectivities' from any taint of empirical grounding or 'psychologistic' provenance." His way of raising these issues gets him beyond Gilbert Ryle (recycles 'psychologistic' charge) and Michael Dummett (pro-Fregean)-and others from that 'other' (non-mainland European) tradition (like the 'nothing works' folks). "His reflections on the problematic status of a prior truth-claims are pursued in a way that contrasts sharply with the approach adopted by philosophers who either reject such claim out of hand or arrive-like Putnam-at the pyrrhic conclusion that the sole candidate for a priori status is a trivially self-evident proposition such as 'not every statement is both true and false'."
McDowell (refer to previous mention of him) suggests grasping Kant's doing away with dichotomies like mind/world, subject/object, concept/intuition, logical form / empirical content, and "see that the mind's 'spontaneity', i.e., its active role in our various processes of knowledge-acquisition, is in no way separable from the mind's 'receptivity', that is to say, its (supposedly) passive registration of incoming sensory stimuli"-while ditching (or embracing? lol) the parts about scheme/content dualism (that knowledge is "a matter of bringing sensuous intuitions under adequate concepts")-but in doing so, he merely "substitutes one dualism for another, that is, Kant's talk of 'spontaneity' and 'receptivity' for his talk of 'concepts of understanding' vis-Ã -vis 'sensuous intuitions'." This part confused me, because it wasn't clear if McDowell was in favor of the latter dichotomy…though, I'm assuming by how it ended that he was. In short: Derrida does it better.
The rest of the section/chapter basically ends the way section 1 begins-refer to that.
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section IV, Part 2-Section V. Derrida.
Section IV, Part 2
"There is plentiful evidence in the writings of Jacques Derrida-especially his early work on Husserl and his Bachelard-influenced analyses of metaphor in the texts of philosophy-that Derridean deconstruction inherits something of the same epistemo-critical agenda. At any rate, it stands well apart from those other movements in recent French though (post-structuralism, postmodernism, and the Foucauldian 'genealogy' of knowledge) that adopts a highly skeptical approach to such issues."
1. "presses hard on various antimonies in Husserl's project-chief among them that of 'genesis' and 'structure'--…with the utmost analytic rigour and with a keen sense of their taking rise from deep-laid yet conflicting necessities of thought which cannot be put down to mere confusion or failure of conceptual grasp."
2. "instances the 'undecidability' of certain propositions with regard to the role of the metaphor in philosophical discourse, this term is not deployed in a loose or ad hoc way (='vagueness', 'ambiguity', etc.) but specifically with reference to Gödel's proof that any formal system complex enough to generate the axioms of elementary arithmetic will contain at least one theorem that cannot be proved within the system itself."
3. Pursues "with no less rigour and tenacity" "the 'logic of supplementarity'" that he "finds everywhere at work in the texts of Rousseau and others" "for its contravening certain classical axioms, i.e., those of bivalence and excluded middle."
There is widespread antipathy to Derrida's work (just wiki Derrida for reasons)-Norris thinks it is mostly due to ignorance of all the background to Derrida's thought. Derrida (and Norris, as we'll soon see) disagrees with the 'analytic' tradition, that we can approach an issue without consulting earlier thought. On the one hand, I think if we have all the tools of previous thinkers, we don't need to read everything they did to arrive at those tools in order to use them. On the other hand-if we want to speak their language, we have to use the terminology with which they are familiar-and to do that, we must read them. Hence, this book discussion…which makes me feel like I've merely chipped the tip of the iceberg. Only by reading folks can you find out where they got stuck, and be able to explain how to get unstuck. Only by reading folks can you save your efforts for work that is left to be done, and avoid reinventing the wheel or repeating the same old mistakes of past thinkers ("conjured away through a Wittgensteinian 'therapeutic' approach that most often leaves them firmly in place")-which is what allowed cultural relativism to creep in.
Section V.
But at last there are signs that folks in the analytic camp are taking another look at issues addressed by post-Kantian epistemological thought, like "the question whether issues of knowledge come down to issues of first-hand epistemic warrant. …the question which divided Neurath and Schlick in the debates around 'old-style' 1930s logical positivism, namely their disagreement as to how far scientific truth-claims could be cashed out in terms of a phenomenalist (sense-datum) language which nevertheless eschewed any recourse to 'subjectivist' or 'psychologistic' modes of thought."
This question still preoccupies recent analytical thinkers-refer back to John McDowell-but suggestions first proposed by Kant are often advanced as if nothing had happened on the continental side ("from Fichte and Schelling, via Hegel, down to Husserl") since then-or that it "represented nothing more than a local aberration from reputable standards of truth, rationality or commonsense warrant. "The problems with McDowell's revisionist reading of Kant-his strenuous attempt to dismount from the 'seesaw' of logical empiricism-are exactly those which first came to view in the quarrel between Fichte's subjective idealism (his idea of the world-constituting Ego) and Schelling's all-encompassing conception of nature as the ultimate source and ground of knowledge." And folks try to appropriate Hegel's work w/o considering "its fortunes in that other (mainland-European) tradition" (Norris says that a lot…maybe he just gets tired of saying 'continental'…wants to mix it up a bit). They have ignored treatment of the issues by 'continental' thinkers from Husserl to Derrida.
Influenced by Wittgenstein, they invoke a naturalized Kant as if the problems which necessarily arise from this are "pseudo-problems that result from our chronic 'bewitchment of language'". But, "they are problems which necessarily arise for any project of thought that attempts to resolve the classic antinomy between truth as a matter of 'absolute ideal objectivity' and truth as lying within the compass of attainable human knowledge." Hmm…maybe I still need to revise my '1', '2' thing from the last two sections? Lol. Oy vey.
The following is updated and corrected in my "starting point" thread.
1. Certain, mind-independent truth (ontology) histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history-hypotheses which have 'transcended the metaphor') 'context of justification'--'absolute ideal objectivity'-omniscience (which, granted, requires mind-but 'facts' are not dependent on that mind for their truth-kind of like how God "is" good, rather than "making" good exist).
2. Uncertain knowledge, belief (epistemology) 'context of discovery'
--Genesis: "process of reasoning by which such truths [structure] are arrived at"-"the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought"--Structure: "distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic"-truth, knowledge, epistemic warrant… (can arrive at truth, but not at omniscience)histoire perimée (lapsed history) - applies to those theories which don't pass muster
[When we come to believe what is true, then 1 and 2 come together (except for that which lapses). All we need to bring 1 and 2 together is a standard for distinguishing true from false-and minds who use the standard. The only being who doesn't need to "use" the standard is an omniscient being, who does not "come to believe"-but eternally knows.]
This is the issue Derrida deals with when he "pursues the antinomy between 'structure' and 'genesis' which results from Husserl's attempt to explain the possibility of objective mathematical truths as somehow resulting from a sequence of discoveries with their own historical and culture-specific conditions of emergence. Thus he shows that Husserl's entire project is riven by these two contradictory imperatives, i.e., the requirement that geometry should on the one hand be conceived as possessing a character of timeless, eternal, a priori truth, while on the other it involves the 'reactivation' of certain cardinal insights that have made up the history of geometrical thought from Euclid to the present day. In particular Derrida brings out the problems that result from any striving to secure the apriority claim when confronted with developments-such as non-Euclidean geometry-which would seem to place large obstacles in its way." What's cool about Derrida is he approached these issues with respect to Husserl's "exemplary rigour" and "the points at which phenomenology runs up against constitutive problems or aporias in its own undertaking."
How to reconcile objectivist verification-transcendent mathematical truth with epistemic accounts which bring truth within reason's grasp, as see in chapter 2, is a main topic of debate for analytic philosophers-and Derrida "takes due stock of the well-known exchange between Husserl and Frege on the status of truths in the formal sciences and the strict necessity-as Frege saw it-to redeem such 'absolute ideal objectivities' from any taint of empirical grounding or 'psychologistic' provenance." His way of raising these issues gets him beyond Gilbert Ryle (recycles 'psychologistic' charge) and Michael Dummett (pro-Fregean)-and others from that 'other' (non-mainland European) tradition (like the 'nothing works' folks). "His reflections on the problematic status of a prior truth-claims are pursued in a way that contrasts sharply with the approach adopted by philosophers who either reject such claim out of hand or arrive-like Putnam-at the pyrrhic conclusion that the sole candidate for a priori status is a trivially self-evident proposition such as 'not every statement is both true and false'."
McDowell (refer to previous mention of him) suggests grasping Kant's doing away with dichotomies like mind/world, subject/object, concept/intuition, logical form / empirical content, and "see that the mind's 'spontaneity', i.e., its active role in our various processes of knowledge-acquisition, is in no way separable from the mind's 'receptivity', that is to say, its (supposedly) passive registration of incoming sensory stimuli"-while ditching (or embracing? lol) the parts about scheme/content dualism (that knowledge is "a matter of bringing sensuous intuitions under adequate concepts")-but in doing so, he merely "substitutes one dualism for another, that is, Kant's talk of 'spontaneity' and 'receptivity' for his talk of 'concepts of understanding' vis-Ã -vis 'sensuous intuitions'." This part confused me, because it wasn't clear if McDowell was in favor of the latter dichotomy…though, I'm assuming by how it ended that he was. In short: Derrida does it better.
The rest of the section/chapter basically ends the way section 1 begins-refer to that.
Norris' "Epistemology" Ch3.IV / Part 1: Bachelard
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris' "Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy"
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section IV.
Part 1: Bachelard.
The shifting pattern of response is not "restricted to the work of German philosophers and critical theorists." French philosophers to be discussed are Gaston Bachelard and Jacques Derrida (influenced by Bachelard), both of whom cut across the traditional divide. Discussion of Derrida will begin in Part II and continues as well in Section V.
Gaston Bachelard cut across the analytic/continental divide, adopting a critical-rationalist approach "which lays chief stress on the capacity of scientific thought to achieve advances in knowledge through the critique of naïve (commonsense) ideas and also of certain a priori intuitions and concepts to the extent that these have proved an obstacle to progress." He was influenced by "mathematician and physicist Henri Poincare who considered such counter-intuitive developments as non-Euclidian geometry to have placed sharp limits on the role of a priori reasoning in science." Bachelard's approach can be considered 'continental' "in so far as it takes a detailed account of the genesis of scientific theories or the kinds of thought-process that are typically involved in the production of scientific knowledge. To that extent it stands within the rationalist traditions, descending from Descartes, which conceives knowledge as involving possession of 'clear and distinct ideas' arrived at through properly disciplined exercise of a priori reason. However, it also marks a break with that tradition by insisting that such clarity can only be attained through the constant critique of supposedly self-evident truths." He retains an interest in the processes of thought through which scientific revolutions occur when received ways of thought are challenged. His study of paradigm-change throughout scientific history differs from Kuhn, because Bachelard recognizes scientific progress can be justified by improved description, prediction and explanation of empirical phenomena-so the continental tradition provides "strong grounds for resisting the cultural-relativist drift that has characterized some developments in post 1970 Anglophone thinking." Bachelard can be contrasted against Kuhn's paradigm-relativism/worlds, and Quine's ontological schemes. Rather than an "outright rejection of that subject-centered or foundationalist epistemology" as displayed in the thought of Lyotard, Heidegger-influenced hermeneutic theorists, the Wittgensteinian 'linguistic turn'-Bachelard's thinking combines "a qualified acceptance of certain Cartesian precepts with a full recognition of the various ways in which it can be led into error through over-reliance on the witness of a priori intuitions and concepts." This is why he concurs with Husserl about the need to account for both the 'genesis' and 'structure' of enquiry (I guess he considered both to be in the 'context of discovery').
His study of analogy and metaphor can be misunderstood to "promote a Nietzschean view of science-or of 'truth' in general-as nothing more than a host of sublimated metaphors and images whose origin has now been forgotten and which thus manage to pass themselves off as veridical concepts." But Bachelard "insists on a process of 'rectification and critique'" whereby the role of metaphor is left behind, transcended, and the theory becomes histoire sanctionée (Black's caloric theory of heat giving way to 'specific heat'; ether giving way to the electromagnetic field defined by Maxwell's equations) ["the history of 'sanctioned' (knowledge-conducive) hypotheses]. That or the model becomes inadequate and relegated to histoire perimée (like the tetrahedral image of the carbon atom, or phlogiston) [the history of lapsed (referentially void) hypotheses]. "These particular examples have been worked out in detail by philosophers of science whose agenda is set by problems and concerns within the broadly 'analytic' tradition. Yet the fact that they converge so strikingly with Bachelard's epistemo-critical approach" is evidence of cutting across "parochial or academic lines of demarcation".
So, histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history) deals with 'context of justification' whereas histoire perimée (lapsed history) can be dealt with sociologically when considering 'context of discovery'. Why theories in the latter category 'lapsed', is because they did not meet the standards of "empirical testing, the framing of apt hypotheses, inference to the best explanation, etc." required of theories in the first category. Bachelard sought to combine these categories-perhaps the way I combined them in my commentary in the last section-that when we believe what is true, and when we use such methods which arrive at truth, then the two categories (a: truth which is true even if we don't know it, b: what we know and how we know it) come together. But Bachelard considered both genesis and structure to be dealt with in the 'context of discovery'
The following is corrected and updated in my "starting point" thread.
So perhaps it would be better to put it this way:
1. Certain, mind-independent truth (ontology) histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history) 'context of justification'
2. Uncertain knowledge, belief (epistemology) 'context of discovery'
--Genesis: "process of reasoning by which such truths are arrived at"-"the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought"--Structure: "'absolute ideal objectivity' that distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic"-truth, knowledge, epistemic warranthistoire perimée (lapsed history) - applies to those theories which don't pass muster
[When we come to believe what is true, then 1 and 2 come together (except for that which lapses). All we need to bring 1 and 2 together is a standard for distinguishing true from false-and minds who use the standard. The only being who doesn't need to "use" the standard is an omniscient being, who does not "come to believe"-but eternally knows.]
Personal note: It makes sense that since all of our knowledge is theory (as we are not omniscient and are incapable of certainty) that we consider genesis and structure not to be separate from eachother-the genesis is really the genesis of structure.
*****
Tiny problem: sanctioned history is defined as knowledge-conducive 'hypotheses' -- but God (the omniscient) does not need hypotheses.
Either a) put sanctioned history down in "epistemology", or b) don't refer to them as 'hypotheses' anymore, since they've "transcended the metaphor".
*****
Important distinction to make that I don't think I made 'very' obvious (prob'ly 'cause the focus is supposed to be on how the traditions are not 'quite' so distinct):
The analytic trandition typically only wants to focus on "structure" (ditching "genesis" when it ditched the self's involvement in enquiry), whereas the continental tradition also considers "genesis" important (helpful in explaining advances/progress). Could be wrong in parts/whole.
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section IV.
Part 1: Bachelard.
The shifting pattern of response is not "restricted to the work of German philosophers and critical theorists." French philosophers to be discussed are Gaston Bachelard and Jacques Derrida (influenced by Bachelard), both of whom cut across the traditional divide. Discussion of Derrida will begin in Part II and continues as well in Section V.
Gaston Bachelard cut across the analytic/continental divide, adopting a critical-rationalist approach "which lays chief stress on the capacity of scientific thought to achieve advances in knowledge through the critique of naïve (commonsense) ideas and also of certain a priori intuitions and concepts to the extent that these have proved an obstacle to progress." He was influenced by "mathematician and physicist Henri Poincare who considered such counter-intuitive developments as non-Euclidian geometry to have placed sharp limits on the role of a priori reasoning in science." Bachelard's approach can be considered 'continental' "in so far as it takes a detailed account of the genesis of scientific theories or the kinds of thought-process that are typically involved in the production of scientific knowledge. To that extent it stands within the rationalist traditions, descending from Descartes, which conceives knowledge as involving possession of 'clear and distinct ideas' arrived at through properly disciplined exercise of a priori reason. However, it also marks a break with that tradition by insisting that such clarity can only be attained through the constant critique of supposedly self-evident truths." He retains an interest in the processes of thought through which scientific revolutions occur when received ways of thought are challenged. His study of paradigm-change throughout scientific history differs from Kuhn, because Bachelard recognizes scientific progress can be justified by improved description, prediction and explanation of empirical phenomena-so the continental tradition provides "strong grounds for resisting the cultural-relativist drift that has characterized some developments in post 1970 Anglophone thinking." Bachelard can be contrasted against Kuhn's paradigm-relativism/worlds, and Quine's ontological schemes. Rather than an "outright rejection of that subject-centered or foundationalist epistemology" as displayed in the thought of Lyotard, Heidegger-influenced hermeneutic theorists, the Wittgensteinian 'linguistic turn'-Bachelard's thinking combines "a qualified acceptance of certain Cartesian precepts with a full recognition of the various ways in which it can be led into error through over-reliance on the witness of a priori intuitions and concepts." This is why he concurs with Husserl about the need to account for both the 'genesis' and 'structure' of enquiry (I guess he considered both to be in the 'context of discovery').
His study of analogy and metaphor can be misunderstood to "promote a Nietzschean view of science-or of 'truth' in general-as nothing more than a host of sublimated metaphors and images whose origin has now been forgotten and which thus manage to pass themselves off as veridical concepts." But Bachelard "insists on a process of 'rectification and critique'" whereby the role of metaphor is left behind, transcended, and the theory becomes histoire sanctionée (Black's caloric theory of heat giving way to 'specific heat'; ether giving way to the electromagnetic field defined by Maxwell's equations) ["the history of 'sanctioned' (knowledge-conducive) hypotheses]. That or the model becomes inadequate and relegated to histoire perimée (like the tetrahedral image of the carbon atom, or phlogiston) [the history of lapsed (referentially void) hypotheses]. "These particular examples have been worked out in detail by philosophers of science whose agenda is set by problems and concerns within the broadly 'analytic' tradition. Yet the fact that they converge so strikingly with Bachelard's epistemo-critical approach" is evidence of cutting across "parochial or academic lines of demarcation".
So, histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history) deals with 'context of justification' whereas histoire perimée (lapsed history) can be dealt with sociologically when considering 'context of discovery'. Why theories in the latter category 'lapsed', is because they did not meet the standards of "empirical testing, the framing of apt hypotheses, inference to the best explanation, etc." required of theories in the first category. Bachelard sought to combine these categories-perhaps the way I combined them in my commentary in the last section-that when we believe what is true, and when we use such methods which arrive at truth, then the two categories (a: truth which is true even if we don't know it, b: what we know and how we know it) come together. But Bachelard considered both genesis and structure to be dealt with in the 'context of discovery'
The following is corrected and updated in my "starting point" thread.
So perhaps it would be better to put it this way:
1. Certain, mind-independent truth (ontology) histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history) 'context of justification'
2. Uncertain knowledge, belief (epistemology) 'context of discovery'
--Genesis: "process of reasoning by which such truths are arrived at"-"the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought"--Structure: "'absolute ideal objectivity' that distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic"-truth, knowledge, epistemic warranthistoire perimée (lapsed history) - applies to those theories which don't pass muster
[When we come to believe what is true, then 1 and 2 come together (except for that which lapses). All we need to bring 1 and 2 together is a standard for distinguishing true from false-and minds who use the standard. The only being who doesn't need to "use" the standard is an omniscient being, who does not "come to believe"-but eternally knows.]
Personal note: It makes sense that since all of our knowledge is theory (as we are not omniscient and are incapable of certainty) that we consider genesis and structure not to be separate from eachother-the genesis is really the genesis of structure.
*****
Tiny problem: sanctioned history is defined as knowledge-conducive 'hypotheses' -- but God (the omniscient) does not need hypotheses.
Either a) put sanctioned history down in "epistemology", or b) don't refer to them as 'hypotheses' anymore, since they've "transcended the metaphor".
*****
Important distinction to make that I don't think I made 'very' obvious (prob'ly 'cause the focus is supposed to be on how the traditions are not 'quite' so distinct):
The analytic trandition typically only wants to focus on "structure" (ditching "genesis" when it ditched the self's involvement in enquiry), whereas the continental tradition also considers "genesis" important (helpful in explaining advances/progress). Could be wrong in parts/whole.
Sunday, August 9, 2009
Norris' "Epistemology" Ch3.III
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris' "Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy"
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section III
Post-Kantian developments, like non-Euclidean geometries and a relativistic conception of space-time, had a lot to do with the analytic turn against a priori truth-claims-since Kant treated Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics as a priori-"a cautionary instance of what goes wrong when notions of intuitive self-evidence or apodictic warrant are accorded such privileged treatment." This caution was transferred to Husserl's phenomenology, with its "pure eidetic inspection". However, "progress in these fields has most often come about through a joint application of intuitive, conceptual and scientifically informed modes of reflective understanding." So a veto on phenomenology would miss much that is involved in progress.
To hold that there are two distinct traditions based on location, which only mingle when philosophers of each location spend time in each other's location, is to "obscure the existence of deeper continuity".
"Besides, it is now acknowledged-even by devoted students of Frege like Michael Dummett-that Husserlian transcendental phenomenology had a genuine claim to logical rigour and that its attempts to explicate the a priori structures and modalities of human knowledge and experience cannot rightfully be put down to any kind of psychologistic aberration." What sets Husserl apart from the 'analytic' tradition (Norris sees this is also the direction in which analytic epistemology is headed) is wanting to account for both aspects of knowledge:
Note: I may have got it wrong--structure and genesis may both belong in the 'epistemology' level ("context of discovery"). See next section for (possible) correction.
1. Structure (ontology): "'absolute ideal objectivity' that distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic" 'context of justification'-truth, knowledge, epistemic warrant
2. Genesis (epistemology): "process of reasoning by which such truths are arrived at" 'context of discovery'-"the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought"
[('1' and '2' seem like they could be titled 1: truth; 2: belief/knowledge/varying degrees of faith, excluding blind faith; 1: "this is what is true" and, 2: "this is what we believe is true, and how we came to believe it" - when we come to believe what is true, then 1 and 2 come together.) (All we need to bring 1 and 2 together is a standard for distinguishing true from false-and minds who use the standard.) The only being who doesn't need to "use" the standard is an omniscient being, who does not "come to believe"-but eternally knows.]
This line of thought (before commentary inside brackets) links Kant and Husserl "in the quest for some means of articulating truth with knowledge, or some way to overcome the problem…of how one can reconcile a realist (or objectivist) conception of truth with an epistemology that brings such truth within the compass of human understanding." That some have given up on such reconciliation suggests they have something to learn from Husserl's phenomenology.
There is understandable resistance to abandoning the distinction between 1 and 2 by "equating 'truth' with the currency of belief at any given time and hence with certain dominant forms of social, political or ideological interest." Ultimate source: Nietzsche ("totally rejected the values of reason, truth and objectivity"). Proximate source: Foucault's "ultra-skeptical 'archaeologies' of the natural and human sciences." Analogue: "skeptically inclined branches of post-analytic philosophy where this particular strain of 'continental' influence is often conjoined with a pragmatist conception of truth as what's 'good in the way of belief' and astrong-descriptivist approach to epistemological issues." Hence the view that we are stuck with '2' and have no access to '1'-that '1' is not possible. After Quine and Kuhn, analytic philosophy, unlike the post-Kantian continental tradition-"lacked…any adequate account of those various knowledge-constitutive modes of perceptual, cognitive and theoretical activity whose role had been so sharply devalued by adherents to the mainstream analytic line," 'cause they took the "self" (knower) out of the picture, which is reeeally ironic (provided I even understand what's going on), finding themselves stuck with '2'.
Re-enter John McDowell. He and others see "Kantian epistemology-or at least certain aspects of it-as pointing a way beyond the unresolved problems with logical empiricism, notably its failure to provide any adequate normative account of knowledge." Repasting from section I:
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section III
Post-Kantian developments, like non-Euclidean geometries and a relativistic conception of space-time, had a lot to do with the analytic turn against a priori truth-claims-since Kant treated Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics as a priori-"a cautionary instance of what goes wrong when notions of intuitive self-evidence or apodictic warrant are accorded such privileged treatment." This caution was transferred to Husserl's phenomenology, with its "pure eidetic inspection". However, "progress in these fields has most often come about through a joint application of intuitive, conceptual and scientifically informed modes of reflective understanding." So a veto on phenomenology would miss much that is involved in progress.
To hold that there are two distinct traditions based on location, which only mingle when philosophers of each location spend time in each other's location, is to "obscure the existence of deeper continuity".
"Besides, it is now acknowledged-even by devoted students of Frege like Michael Dummett-that Husserlian transcendental phenomenology had a genuine claim to logical rigour and that its attempts to explicate the a priori structures and modalities of human knowledge and experience cannot rightfully be put down to any kind of psychologistic aberration." What sets Husserl apart from the 'analytic' tradition (Norris sees this is also the direction in which analytic epistemology is headed) is wanting to account for both aspects of knowledge:
Note: I may have got it wrong--structure and genesis may both belong in the 'epistemology' level ("context of discovery"). See next section for (possible) correction.
1. Structure (ontology): "'absolute ideal objectivity' that distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic" 'context of justification'-truth, knowledge, epistemic warrant
2. Genesis (epistemology): "process of reasoning by which such truths are arrived at" 'context of discovery'-"the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought"
[('1' and '2' seem like they could be titled 1: truth; 2: belief/knowledge/varying degrees of faith, excluding blind faith; 1: "this is what is true" and, 2: "this is what we believe is true, and how we came to believe it" - when we come to believe what is true, then 1 and 2 come together.) (All we need to bring 1 and 2 together is a standard for distinguishing true from false-and minds who use the standard.) The only being who doesn't need to "use" the standard is an omniscient being, who does not "come to believe"-but eternally knows.]
This line of thought (before commentary inside brackets) links Kant and Husserl "in the quest for some means of articulating truth with knowledge, or some way to overcome the problem…of how one can reconcile a realist (or objectivist) conception of truth with an epistemology that brings such truth within the compass of human understanding." That some have given up on such reconciliation suggests they have something to learn from Husserl's phenomenology.
There is understandable resistance to abandoning the distinction between 1 and 2 by "equating 'truth' with the currency of belief at any given time and hence with certain dominant forms of social, political or ideological interest." Ultimate source: Nietzsche ("totally rejected the values of reason, truth and objectivity"). Proximate source: Foucault's "ultra-skeptical 'archaeologies' of the natural and human sciences." Analogue: "skeptically inclined branches of post-analytic philosophy where this particular strain of 'continental' influence is often conjoined with a pragmatist conception of truth as what's 'good in the way of belief' and astrong-descriptivist approach to epistemological issues." Hence the view that we are stuck with '2' and have no access to '1'-that '1' is not possible. After Quine and Kuhn, analytic philosophy, unlike the post-Kantian continental tradition-"lacked…any adequate account of those various knowledge-constitutive modes of perceptual, cognitive and theoretical activity whose role had been so sharply devalued by adherents to the mainstream analytic line," 'cause they took the "self" (knower) out of the picture, which is reeeally ironic (provided I even understand what's going on), finding themselves stuck with '2'.
Re-enter John McDowell. He and others see "Kantian epistemology-or at least certain aspects of it-as pointing a way beyond the unresolved problems with logical empiricism, notably its failure to provide any adequate normative account of knowledge." Repasting from section I:
John McDowell (and other analytic revisionists) "recommend a return to certain Kantian insights, albeit through a highly selective ('naturalized' or 'detranscendentalized') reading of Kant."
These 'revaluations' "still inherit something of the logical-empiricist prejudice against explaining both "structure" and "genesis" of knowledge, both "process of arrival" and standards for being able to say "we've arrived". It was for want of these things that analytic philosophy "gave way" to "Quinean 'ontological relativity', Kuhnian paradigm-relativism, Richard Rorty's far-out linguistic-constructivist creed, and the 'strong' programme in sociology of knowledge."
Norris says we need to recognize "that these problems have arisen very largely in consequence of the artificial divide between developments in post-Kantian 'continental' and Anglophone 'analytic' thought."
"One could instance Husserl's great book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenologyas the first to diagnose this widening gulf." "…a long-range historical perspective going back to various nineteenth century debates about the role of scientific knowledge and enlightened rationality vis-Ã -vis the claims of hermeneutic understanding or immersion in the 'lifeworld' of humanly intelligible values and beliefs." Whatever THAT means. Though Husserl 'vacillated' between these two priorities, he "took a stance squarely opposed to any form of irrationalist or counter-Enlightenment reaction."
The same could be said "of those Frankfurt-School critical theorists (such as Jurgen Habermas) who defend the 'unfinished project of modernity' against its current detractors by examining the various orders of truth-claim-or the different spheres of validity-that have separated out within the discourse of the physical, social and human sciences." Habermas conserved the critical/progressive impulses of Enlightenment thought, "deriving those emancipatory values from a theory of 'communicative action' based on the idea of free and equal exchange between all parties with access to the relevant (more or less specialized) information sources. In which case philosophy can take on board the whole range of anti-foundationalist arguments brought against more traditional forms of epistemology by proponents of the present-day 'linguistic turn' and yet maintain a principled commitment to the standing possibility of truth and progress in the scientific, ethical and socio-political spheres. This approach abandons the old subject-centred epistemological paradigm, but does so-crucially-without yielding ground to the kinds of cultural-relativist thinking that have often been advanced by followers of Wittgenstein or by those who appeal to 'language games' or 'forms of life' as the furthest we can get in the quest for validating grounds, reasons or principles." Can learn from this as from Husserl.
So, it cannot be said that cultural relativism is a disease spread by the post-Kantian 'continental' tradition, as 1) the most powerful arguments against it are from continental philosophers, 2) a limited number of continental philosophers attempted to spread it [Foucault, Lyotard's "sweeping postmodernist pronouncements about the end of 'grand narratives' such as that of scientific truth at the end of enquiry", Heidegger's "sweeping diagnosis of modern techno-science as the predestined outcome of western (post-Hellenic) metaphysics and its drive to dominate nature and thought through an epochal forgetfulness of Being"] and 3) it is spread by some in recent Anglophone epistemology and philosophy of science (Rorty's and others' improbable attempt "to enlist Heidegger's depth-hermeneutic approach in the service of a highly selective reading that tallies well enough with a homegrown pragmatist outlook"; similarities between "'strong' sociologists of knowledge and hermeneutic thinkers in the Heidegger-to-Gadamer line of descent"), 4) one must "take full account of its sources in Wittgenstein, Kuhn, American pragmatism, and other influences nearer home." Home…hmm.
I wonder why Heidegger isn't discussed more. Maybe he will be. Also wonder why "hermeneutics" isn't discussed more.
*****
This perked up my ears:
1. Truth is more important than you think.
v4-5 freedom in Christ because of truth of the Gospel (truth will set you free) John 8
Foucault-"truth is a thing of this world, it is produced only by multiple forms of constraint, and that includes the regular effects of power" - truth claims are power plays
--disciple of Nietzsche (hermeneutics of suspicion) (philosophical squinting) (motive?)
--same thing Jesus says of Pharisees-your truth claims are power plays
But, if you conclude "all" truth claims are power plays, you're wrong. C.S. Lewis in "The Abolition of Man"--
"You cannot go on 'seeing through' things forever" - if you say "all truth claims are power plays" - you are saying 'that' truth claim is just a power play (not true)
It's not the truth claim (the "fundamental")-it's what's "in" the truth claim (the "fundamental")-that leads or does not lead to oppression.
Fundamental truth claim: grace. If you're out of touch with that reality/truth-no freedom (truth will set you free). Everything else is "real" slavery/addiction to whatever else it is you build your identity on.
http://ichthus.yuku.com/reply/323/t/RFG-3-Christianity-Is-a-Straitjacket.html#reply-323
*****
Oddly--I used the words "grand narrative" in my paper before I even knew Lyotard, or his phrase grand/meta narrative, even existed. But--it still works, either way you take it, I think.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metanarrative
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Norris' "Epistemology" Ch3.II / Part 2: Koyré
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris' "Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy"
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section II.
Part 2: Koyré (Norris does not split the section into parts.)
Alexandre Koyré also transcends the rift between the analytic and continental traditions. "Best known as a philosopher-historian of early modern science," he was a Russian exile who went from Germany to France and taught in both the U.S. and France after WWII. His "intense speculative bent and vast range of interests (in mathematics, physics, cosmology, philosophy, theology and various traditions of Neo-Platonic and mystical thought) place his work far apart from mainstream approaches to the subject."
In common with Duhem:
1. "rejected the conventional view that genuine scientific knowledge got started only with the passage from 'medieval' to 'renaissance' modes of thought, that is, through a decisive enabling break with the legacy of hidebound scholastic doctrine which prevailed in the earlier period."
2. "shared Duhem's great aim of reawakening philosophers to the range and vitality of medieval thought, while stressing just the opposite (realist) aspects of what he took to constitute its chief and enduring legacy."
Koyré was a realist (opposed to instrumentalist thinking like that of Duhem) because:
1. Believed "science could deliver objective knowledge of a mind-independent physical reality…" (as did some medieval thinkers)
2. which consists of "objects, properties and causal powers whose essential nature was such as to determine whether or not scientific enquiry was on the right track," (as did Aristotle).
3. Espoused "a basically Platonist outlook which aspired to transcend the epistemic contingencies of scientific knowledge at this or that state in its advancement to date."
Koyré's work [including Etudes galileennes (1939)] is characterized by:
1. "originality of mind…expansive vision of philosophy of science as a quest for universal yet historically emergent and culturally salient truths."
2. "detailed and exacting analysis of scientific theories-…theories of movement, stasis and inertial force-while drawing out the kinds of problem and paradox that have preoccupied philosophers from Zeno to the present."
3. "treats these issues within a larger metaphysical framework that takes them to involve fundamental questions such as those first broached by the conflicting claims of Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies."
4. Preference for Plato seen "above all in Koyré's realist philosophy of mathematics; antipathy toward empiricist conception of scientific method."
He was influenced by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (very often dissenting from it)-and took from Husserl "the idea of philosophy as a rigorous, reflective, self-critical activity of thought which suspended (or bracketed) our commonsense beliefs and thereby sought to reveal the underlying, a priori, and hence universally valid structures of knowledge and experience." Like Husserl, he went back and forth between this and acknowledging the task's dependence "on modes of intuitive self-evidence…being-in-the-world as historically and culturally situated agents." He criticized "the strain of transcendental idealism" in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, which he felt fell away from "the vocation of rigorous, scientifically disciplined enquiry." Had recourse to "the evidence of modern (post-Galilean) scientific thought but also to the Thomist theological tradition which likewise-albeit for different reasons-rejected any notion of human knowledge (even at the limit of idealized rational acceptability) as the ultimate arbiter of truth." [At the same time he claimed "that modern science had by no means shed its 'metaphysical' commitments-as argued by hard-line positivists-but on the contrary continued to enlist such resources so as it render its truth-claims and its theories intelligible."] "No philosopher in recent times has done more to uphold the claims of scientific rationality and truth while taking on board such a range of arguments from (seemingly) opposed viewpoints. Thus his critique of positivism for its anti-metaphysical prejudice went along with his equally trenchant critique of those idealist-'metaphysical'-currents of thought which paid insufficient regard to the manifest achievements of physical science."
This explains his impact "during that period of pre-war French intellectual debate when thinkers like Sartre were attempting a synthesis of Husserlian transcendental with Heideggerian existentialist phenomenology, and these in turn with an understanding of Hegel mediated by Kojeve's strong-revisionist reading." Koyré had a good historical grasp of the sources of the debate.
Koyré "made no sharp distinction between the sorts of theological issue (such as realism versus nominalism) that had so preoccupied medieval thinkers and the sorts ofmetaphysical issue that continued to emerge with undiminished force when science took its turn toward a broadly secularized worldview." This is due to his attraction to Levy-Bruhl's thought (collective mind-sets) and "nineteenth-century hermeneutic philosophy" [like Wilhelm Dilthey's 'worldviews' or Weltanschauungen] both of which gave him the "sense of the problems involved in negotiating differences of cultural outlook or deep-laid metaphysical commitment." Yet-he didn't go the way of Michel Foucault's skeptical nominalism, treating all knowledge as cultural construct, relative to period of discourse. Nor was he ever a paradigm-relativist like Kuhn. Koyré believed "science is indeed a continuing venture of discovery and that differences of mind-set-however profound-can nonetheless be rendered intelligible from a sufficiently informed historico-philosophical viewpoint." It was his (realist) conviction that "scientific knowledge was properly aimed toward discovering the essence of things rather than contenting itself with merely nominal definitions." Totally clashed with anti-metaphysical positivism.
So he went outside the box a bit-"Renaissance hermetic philosophies (Paracelsus), Romantic mysticism (Boehme) and various nineteenth-century Russian proto-existentialist ideas-all of which he sought to bring within the compass of a unified history of thought. …his chief motive was to vindicate the claims of mathematics and the physical sciences as aimed toward a truth which transcended the socio-cultural vicissitudes of time and place." -one indicator being the diverse thinkers he chose to study under…. "while nonetheless respecting those essential standards-of truth, objectivity and conceptual rigor-that characterized mathematics and the physical sciences." In the 'science wars' or 'culture wars' debate, composed of hard-line scientific realism, cultural-relativism/social-constructivism, Koyré "held out…the prospect of achieving a perspective atop these particular kinds of academic or interdisciplinary dispute…points a way forward from some of the more sterile or deadlocked disputes in recent epistemology and philosophy of science."These things keep popping up (not just in Norris' book) and I would eventually like to explore them at more depth (hopefully Norris does this)--
Nominalism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism
Problem of universals: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals
Apparently realism is non-nominalism-believes in universals. I'm wondering if the section on descriptivism/naming had anything to do with it? I'm hoping not…I'm thinking not.
*****
a synthesis of Husserlian transcendental with Heideggerian existentialist phenomenology, and these in turn with an understanding of Hegel mediated by Kojeve's strong-revisionist reading
--would love to know the ins and outs of that
Chapter 3: 'Fog Over Channel, Continent Isolated': Epistemology in the 'Two Traditions' - Section II.
Part 2: Koyré (Norris does not split the section into parts.)
Alexandre Koyré also transcends the rift between the analytic and continental traditions. "Best known as a philosopher-historian of early modern science," he was a Russian exile who went from Germany to France and taught in both the U.S. and France after WWII. His "intense speculative bent and vast range of interests (in mathematics, physics, cosmology, philosophy, theology and various traditions of Neo-Platonic and mystical thought) place his work far apart from mainstream approaches to the subject."
In common with Duhem:
1. "rejected the conventional view that genuine scientific knowledge got started only with the passage from 'medieval' to 'renaissance' modes of thought, that is, through a decisive enabling break with the legacy of hidebound scholastic doctrine which prevailed in the earlier period."
2. "shared Duhem's great aim of reawakening philosophers to the range and vitality of medieval thought, while stressing just the opposite (realist) aspects of what he took to constitute its chief and enduring legacy."
Koyré was a realist (opposed to instrumentalist thinking like that of Duhem) because:
1. Believed "science could deliver objective knowledge of a mind-independent physical reality…" (as did some medieval thinkers)
2. which consists of "objects, properties and causal powers whose essential nature was such as to determine whether or not scientific enquiry was on the right track," (as did Aristotle).
3. Espoused "a basically Platonist outlook which aspired to transcend the epistemic contingencies of scientific knowledge at this or that state in its advancement to date."
Koyré's work [including Etudes galileennes (1939)] is characterized by:
1. "originality of mind…expansive vision of philosophy of science as a quest for universal yet historically emergent and culturally salient truths."
2. "detailed and exacting analysis of scientific theories-…theories of movement, stasis and inertial force-while drawing out the kinds of problem and paradox that have preoccupied philosophers from Zeno to the present."
3. "treats these issues within a larger metaphysical framework that takes them to involve fundamental questions such as those first broached by the conflicting claims of Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies."
4. Preference for Plato seen "above all in Koyré's realist philosophy of mathematics; antipathy toward empiricist conception of scientific method."
He was influenced by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (very often dissenting from it)-and took from Husserl "the idea of philosophy as a rigorous, reflective, self-critical activity of thought which suspended (or bracketed) our commonsense beliefs and thereby sought to reveal the underlying, a priori, and hence universally valid structures of knowledge and experience." Like Husserl, he went back and forth between this and acknowledging the task's dependence "on modes of intuitive self-evidence…being-in-the-world as historically and culturally situated agents." He criticized "the strain of transcendental idealism" in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, which he felt fell away from "the vocation of rigorous, scientifically disciplined enquiry." Had recourse to "the evidence of modern (post-Galilean) scientific thought but also to the Thomist theological tradition which likewise-albeit for different reasons-rejected any notion of human knowledge (even at the limit of idealized rational acceptability) as the ultimate arbiter of truth." [At the same time he claimed "that modern science had by no means shed its 'metaphysical' commitments-as argued by hard-line positivists-but on the contrary continued to enlist such resources so as it render its truth-claims and its theories intelligible."] "No philosopher in recent times has done more to uphold the claims of scientific rationality and truth while taking on board such a range of arguments from (seemingly) opposed viewpoints. Thus his critique of positivism for its anti-metaphysical prejudice went along with his equally trenchant critique of those idealist-'metaphysical'-currents of thought which paid insufficient regard to the manifest achievements of physical science."
This explains his impact "during that period of pre-war French intellectual debate when thinkers like Sartre were attempting a synthesis of Husserlian transcendental with Heideggerian existentialist phenomenology, and these in turn with an understanding of Hegel mediated by Kojeve's strong-revisionist reading." Koyré had a good historical grasp of the sources of the debate.
Koyré "made no sharp distinction between the sorts of theological issue (such as realism versus nominalism) that had so preoccupied medieval thinkers and the sorts ofmetaphysical issue that continued to emerge with undiminished force when science took its turn toward a broadly secularized worldview." This is due to his attraction to Levy-Bruhl's thought (collective mind-sets) and "nineteenth-century hermeneutic philosophy" [like Wilhelm Dilthey's 'worldviews' or Weltanschauungen] both of which gave him the "sense of the problems involved in negotiating differences of cultural outlook or deep-laid metaphysical commitment." Yet-he didn't go the way of Michel Foucault's skeptical nominalism, treating all knowledge as cultural construct, relative to period of discourse. Nor was he ever a paradigm-relativist like Kuhn. Koyré believed "science is indeed a continuing venture of discovery and that differences of mind-set-however profound-can nonetheless be rendered intelligible from a sufficiently informed historico-philosophical viewpoint." It was his (realist) conviction that "scientific knowledge was properly aimed toward discovering the essence of things rather than contenting itself with merely nominal definitions." Totally clashed with anti-metaphysical positivism.
So he went outside the box a bit-"Renaissance hermetic philosophies (Paracelsus), Romantic mysticism (Boehme) and various nineteenth-century Russian proto-existentialist ideas-all of which he sought to bring within the compass of a unified history of thought. …his chief motive was to vindicate the claims of mathematics and the physical sciences as aimed toward a truth which transcended the socio-cultural vicissitudes of time and place." -one indicator being the diverse thinkers he chose to study under…. "while nonetheless respecting those essential standards-of truth, objectivity and conceptual rigor-that characterized mathematics and the physical sciences." In the 'science wars' or 'culture wars' debate, composed of hard-line scientific realism, cultural-relativism/social-constructivism, Koyré "held out…the prospect of achieving a perspective atop these particular kinds of academic or interdisciplinary dispute…points a way forward from some of the more sterile or deadlocked disputes in recent epistemology and philosophy of science."These things keep popping up (not just in Norris' book) and I would eventually like to explore them at more depth (hopefully Norris does this)--
Nominalism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism
Problem of universals: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals
Apparently realism is non-nominalism-believes in universals. I'm wondering if the section on descriptivism/naming had anything to do with it? I'm hoping not…I'm thinking not.
*****
a synthesis of Husserlian transcendental with Heideggerian existentialist phenomenology, and these in turn with an understanding of Hegel mediated by Kojeve's strong-revisionist reading
--would love to know the ins and outs of that
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)