Outside the Box: on the ‘extended mind’ hypothesis by Christopher Norris

Philosopher Christopher Norris, whose book Epistemology is discussed here on Ichthus77, has granted me permission to post the following as a guest post and enter it into the most recent Philosophers' Carnival.  It was written a couple weeks back and is under consideration for a regular print journal, so until then I am honored to display it here.  Thankyou, Professor Norris :)

Outside the Box: on the ‘extended mind’ hypothesis

Christopher Norris

Abstract

In this essay I examine various aspects of the ‘extended mind’ (EM) thesis proposed by David Chalmers and Andy Clark. Their claim is that various items of extra-cranial equipment (ranging from notebooks to iPhones) are so closely bound up with the mental processes of those who use them that they must – on a ‘parity principle’ – count as parts or integral components of the users’ minds. Opponents of the thesis typically object that minds don’t have parts, that the devices in question are themselves products of human ingenuity, and that intentionality – the mark of the mental – cannot be attributed to notebooks or iPhones without falling into gross confusion. In response the advocates of ‘strong’ EM run a range of arguments, mostly of the slippery-slope kind, in order to press their point that there is no way to draw a firm or principled line between ‘internal’ and ‘extraneous’ modes of mental extension or cognitive enhancement.

Philosophers' Carnival #127

Welcome to the June 27, 2011 edition of Philosophers' Carnival.  First those blog posts which were actually submitted will be listed, followed by blog posts which were gleaned.  If you submitted a good post that was not included, please know there has been a glitch with blogcarnival.  Email me and it will be remedied.

Submitted:

epistemology

Aaron Rathbun presents Obama's Birth Certificate and Epistemology posted at theology+culture, saying, "This post is about postfoundationalist epistemology. "Birthers" doubting Obama's birth certificate will never have any sufficient amount of evidence to prove them otherwise, because our presuppositional commitments shape how we filter the evidence to begin with."

Matt Flannagan presents In Defense of Reasonable Disagreement by Andrew, posted at MandM.

logic and language

Tristan Haze presents Sketch of a Way of Thinking about Modality - Part 1 posted at Sprachlogik.

metaphysics

Michael S. Pearl presents Matters of Choice and Free Will posted at The Kindly Ones, saying, "This actually relates to logic and epistemology as well."

mind

gualtiero piccinini presents Was Psychosemantics a Failure? posted at Brains.

Christopher Norris presents Outside the Box:  on the 'extended mind' hypothesis posted at Ichthus77.

moral philosophy

Richard presents The Normativity Objection to Metaethical Naturalism posted at Philosophy, et cetera.

Greg Nirshberg presents What we miss in the free will debate posted at Cognitive Philosophy.

Matt Flannagan presents Lawful Authority and Just Wars posted at MandM.

Jeremy Pierce presents Abortion and Incurred Responsibility posted at Parableman.

Philosophers' Carnival call for submissions

I'll be hosting the next Philosophers' Carnival on June 27 (submit by June 25).  Email submission if need be.

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Some topics I'd like to see in the submissions:

• How can an objectively true moral 'ought' correspond to the 'is' of reality?
• Is free will scientifically possible?  Is moral responsibility possible without it?
• Respond to this:  If the strong sociologist counters with the argument from error, they are affirming a realist premise, since “they rely on the assumption that some past theories were true (or scientifically warranted) despite the weight of received opinion at the time,” (Christopher Norris, Epistemology, Postscript II).
• Respond to this: Admitting that false grounds are false grounds is admitting they are non-justifiers, so that Gettier’s problem examples do not involve instances of justified, true belief, and so do not challenge Plato’s justified-true-belief account of knowledge.
• Does "God commands in accordance with his good nature" and Plato's justified-true-belief requirement for knowledge show Euthyphro's Dilemma to be a false one?
• Hume's fork:  What, if any, is the connection between Hume's is-ought problem (is this really a problem?) and his problem of induction (is this really a problem)?  Did he see a connection?
• Why is there something, rather than nothing?
• Why is every major theory in Ethics compared to the Golden Rule in my Intro. to Ethics text, yet the Golden Rule is not considered as a theory in itself?  Is this common to introductory Ethics texts?
• Why should any and/or every person care about philosophy?
• Show how your favored theory in Ethics is superior to the others by applying each to a current event or common moral dilemma.  Top it off with the first question in this list.
• Feel free to reply to this blog post and submit your own with other good ideas.

Christian Carnival CCCLXXXIV

Welcome to what should have been the June 15, 2011 edition of christian carnival ii.

There was a glitch with blogcarnival, so Fish and Cans is rescheduling for a later date.  All apologies that this was not posted Wednesday.  All Things New is up for Wednesday the 22nd.

Central Valley location of first CAA chapter

Have you heard of Christian Apologetics Alliance (CAA) yet? CAA is a recently formed group of Christian bloggers started by Scott Rachui (The Christian Worldview) and Chris Reese (Cloud of Witnesses). The Central Valley is the location of CAA’s first local chapter.