The Moral Argument

Update 1/30:  Expanded on some things

The Moral Argument

I don’t like the traditional version of this argument that argues from the moral law to a moral law-giver:

Traditional Argument from Morality

Premise 1:  There is an objective moral law.
Premise 2:  Every law implies a law-giver.
Conclusion:  Therefore, there is a moral law-giver.

The most important problem with this argument is, if God is not just making stuff up, then he is the goodness described by the moral law, which means he is “that to which the moral law corresponds” or “that which the moral law describes”.  So, you could rephrase the argument this way:

Poll: What grounds objective moral truth?

• God wills the good in accordance with his loving nature.
• The good is a construct of God, man or nature.
• Nothing, there are only constructs which do not obligate.
  
  Vote here! (I think the link went dead when I deleted my first Facebook account.)

UPDATE 12/31:  Vote here!  Happy New Year :0)

In other words:

What grounds objective moral truth (or “human rights”)?

A.  The good is a construct of God, man or nature—the good is created (made up). 
B.  God wills the good in accordance with his loving nature—the good is discovered.
C.  Nothing, there are only constructs which do not obligate—there is no good (neither).

created/discovered/neither — easy to memorize

The Humean-Platonic tripartite (Ought-Is-Belief) theory of (moral) knowledge

The Humean-Platonic tripartite (Ought-Is-Belief) theory of (moral) knowledge
It is possible to blend Hume’s is-ought distinction (1) in Ethics with Plato’s justified-true-belief theory of knowledge. 

Simply put, whatever sort of beliefs one is talking about, including moral beliefs, they must be ‘both’ justified by reasons (a justified belief OUGHT to be believed) ‘and’ correspondent to reality (a true belief IS true). Just because one has good reasons for one’s belief does not mean it is true. And even if one believes something that is true, one may have horrible reasons for believing it (bit of a tangent: Gettier was wrong in assuming falsehoods count towards justification) (Gettier is answered elsewhere (2)). All of this is true about any belief one holds, moral or otherwise. In order for one’s belief to be knowledge, it must satisfy those two conditions: 1: It must be backed by good reasons (justified/ought). 2: It must correspond to reality (true/is). These conditions are very different from each other. Both are required separately. So, satisfying both conditions is not Hume’s problem—it is when one condition takes the place of the other that one commits Hume’s is-ought fallacy, or its reverse (ought-is).

That said…

Hume obviously only drew this distinction when he was discussing moral knowledge, not any other kind of knowledge, and Plato grappled with Euthyphro’s (false) dilemma (it, skeptics, anti-realists and Gettier are all answered elsewhere (2)).

If one understands the blending and one is not a Christian, one may not be comfortable with it because one’s moral theory doesn’t correspond to, or describe, anything in reality, knowing of no always-good person who never has and never will violate one’s moral theory. That discomfort, though understandable, is not a valid reason to reject the is-ought distinction.

If one is a theist who still rejects Hume’s is-ought distinction because one thinks it means the Good cannot correspond to God, then one is misunderstanding what Hume really meant by his distinction, and there is still some work to do in communicating the blending properly. Even educated Christians like Dr. Richard Weikart and Dr. William Lane Craig share such a misunderstanding. Dr. Craig says:

(quotes omitted) …the theistic view is that these qualities are good because (Maryann: rather than exist as, or exist if) they are found in God’s nature. The alternative (that God is good because his nature matches the Good) is just Platonism all over again, which we’ve already rejected (see my three-pronged critique of Platonism).

(3)

and 

The theory that I have defended is a form of Divine Command Theory. According to this view our moral duties are constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. It seems to me that this theory does derive an “ought” from an “is,” and justifiably so—though not in the way you imagine. The theory does, as you say, ground moral values in God's unchanging nature. God is the paradigm of goodness. But that is not to say that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways.” No, our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us. God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness—while God’s commands establish moral duties—what we ought or ought not to do. Grounding moral values in God no more derives an “ought” from an “is” than does Plato’s grounding values in the form of the Good (indeed, one of my critiques of moral platonism is precisely its failure to provide any basis for moral duty). The theist and Plato just have a different ontological ultimate.

(4)

It is unclear here whether or not Dr. Craig thinks the is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy. He seems to when he dismisses the idea that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways” (ibid). But he seems not to when he asserts “our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us” (ibid). It is a tangent, but he also unnecessarily distinguishes between moral obligations and moral values. Anyway, to say “because this is God’s command, we ought to behave according to it” commits the is-ought fallacy.

There has been some discourse with Dr. Craig on this matter via Facebook (5), and via email with Dr. Weikart. Dr. Weikart’s most recent reply just restates his misunderstanding: 

You are denying the is-ought distinction, because (Maryann: according to me, Maryann) moral goodness (ought) is integrally connected to God’s being (is).

(via email)

Grounded in, yes. Justified by, no.




Reference List

1. Ichthus77. (2011). Where I am at with Hume’s is-ought distinction. Retrieved from http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/07/where-i-am-at-with-humes-is-ought.html

2. Ichthus77. (2011). Answering Gettier. Retrieved from http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/01/answering-gettier.html

3. Reasonable Faith. (2012). Moral Argument for God. Retrieved from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument-for-god#ixzz23vssuCM3

4. Reasonable Faith. (2012). Does Theistic Ethics Derive an “Ought” from an “Is”? Retrieved from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-theistic-ethics-derive-an-ought-from-an-is#ixzz23vtucp00

5. Ichthus77. (2012). Is-ought discussion with WLC. Retrieved from http://www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2012/01/is-ought-discussion-with-wlc.html 

Groothuis' "Christian Apologetics" ch.6: Truth Defined and Defended

The apologetics study group LOVES this quote from Groothuis' Christian Apologetics:  "We may be entitled to our own opinions, but we are not entitled to our own facts." p. 124  It's actually a variant of a quote commonly attributed to Daniel Patrick Moynihan and a couple others, but that is not credited in the book.  Still--it is true.  I think it is fair to say it has achieved meme-status.

"'Adultery is wrong' is true because that statement corresponds to the objective, universal and absolute moral law revealed by God, which is in accordance with his eternally stable character and the character of his creation." p. 126

That last quote hits on natural law, divine command, Euthyphro's Dilemma, the is-ought fallacy, et cetera.  I am currently discussing that with some folks from ILP here, and have done some work on it previously if you scroll to the relevant section here (“Euthyphro, Hume, Plato, Gettier”).

(discussion index)

This week's Christian Carnival is...

...here.  I host it at my new on-line portfolio blog :)  I am not including my own submission this time, because I am still chewing on an idea for an article that talks about the difference between Hume’s is-ought distinction, which maintains a valid distinction between ontology and epistemology, and the false is-ought dichotomy, which keeps values outside the realm of truth.  One can rightly reject the false dichotomy without rejecting the is-ought distinction.  I think making clear the differences between the two will help further the dialogue in this area of philosophy and apologetics.  If you want to see my past posts on Hume’s is-ought, scroll to the “Euthyphro, Hume, Plato, Gettier” section here.  Favorite topic!

Philosophers' Carnival #138

Welcome again to Philosophers’ Carnival, “which aims to showcase the best philosophical posts from a wide range of weblogs. We invite submissions from bloggers and readers, and collate the submitted posts into one big round-up (or ‘carnival’) every three weeks, offering a brief summary of each entry, and a link to the complete post.”  This is carnival #138.

We begin with…

Ethics

What being is described by a without-God good?

From a discussion in a Veritas forum:

If you ask:

To what does a real ought correspond?

...or...

What does a real ought describe?

...you will notice that science will have as easy a time answering that as answering:

What began the universe?

...or...

Why is there something rather than nothing?

***

This to me gives new meaning to "Alpha and Omega"--he began it all and he is its ultimate End.

Is-ought discussion with WLC

I had a discussion with Dr. Craig in a note I posted on Facebook, but I am deleting Facebook Sunday and the discussion was never resolved, so I am moving it to here.  Hopefully he can reply here or in one of his weekly Q&A on his Reasonable Faith site.

***

Dr. Craig,

In "Question of the Week #222: Why Is God the Foundation of Moral Values?" you said, "these qualities are good because they are found in God's nature." Doesn't that commit the is-ought fallacy? I was wondering if I could get some feedback on a resolution to this I've been chewing on for years (since roughly 2007). There are two issues here. 1) Whether or not there 'is' moral truth, and to what it might correspond (metaphysical/ontological), 2) What we truly 'ought' to do, and how we justify that (epistemological/justification). God's nature grounds the first option ("is"), but can not ground the second ("ought") (Hume's is-ought fallacy). And if we have justification for the second ("ought"), that does not necessarily mean we've satisfied the first ("is") (antirealism/postmodernism) (reverse is-ought). So--we must have both, independently--Plato's "Justified-True-Belief" requirement for knowledge (including moral knowledge) (I answer Gettier elsewhere if you'd like to examine that and offer feedback see the first link below). The Euthyphro Dilemma and Hume's is-ought fallacy are basically saying the same thing, and apply to moral knowledge as much as they apply to other knowledge: a (moral) belief is not true because it is justified, and it isn't justified because it is true. So the good cannot be justified by its corresponding to God's nature, for that commits the is-ought fallacy and does not escape the Euthyphro Dilemma. Instead, we must use reasons to show that the good is justified. Still, reasons alone do not show that there is a 'real' good--there must exist a being to which it may correspond (God). No God, no 'true/correspondent' good. No plants, no 'true/correspondent' formula for photosynthesis. So--how do we use reasons to show that the good is justified? We consider the questions that all the theories on-offer are considering, we rule out any inconsistent theories, and we see the theory/answer with which we are left (I believe that is where plausibility can then come in). I believe that most-plausible theory is the Golden Rule (self=Other) as demonstrated by Christ in switching perspectives with us on the cross. I discuss the common questions and inconsistencies of other theories, et cetera, elsewhere and would love for you to offer feedback on my thinking if you would like to examine the link below (2) which is a bit of a nutshell-version (still pretty rough). I hope you are doing well and I'll end this here. Oh, also, I have other questions in the third link below.

Respectfully,

Maryann/Ichthus77

(1) http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/01/answering-gettier.html

(2) http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/08/appendix-g-synthesizing-golden-rule.html

(3) http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/04/questions-regarding-first-chapter-of.html

Saturday, August 6, 2011 at 3:06pm

***


William Lane Craig: Take a look at QoW #165 for my take on this, Maryann.

August 6, 2011 at 3:58pm

Maryann Spikes:
Thankyou so much for referring me to that question. I looked it up here: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8215 If you feel you are 'really' deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' (at first you say you do, and then you say you don't) how can you consistently call others on it, like in your debate with Sam Harris? But, I don't think you really are committing that fallacy (although, I think you did in QoW 222, when you said "are good because" instead of "exist, as")--since we both agree (myself above, yourself in QoW #165) that there is a distinction between "justification" and "ontological foundation". I agree with you when you say in QoW 165 that it is wrong to say “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways.” You are right, and it is wrong, because it commits the is-ought fallacy. But then you go on to say "our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us." If God's commands are not in accordance with his nature, then your statement amounts to voluntarism--to God making things up arbitrarily. So, our moral obligations and prohibitions, if God is not just making things up, are in accordance with his nature--but are not "justified by" the mere fact of his nature, for that would commit the is-ought fallacy, no?

This arises because you do not in your mind connect "these qualities" with "moral obligations and prohibitions". In #165 and elsewhere (On Gaurd, Reasonable Faith), you do not equate moral goodness with the purpose of the universe, and you do not equate our hunger for meaning with our sense of obligation...these things are actually equivalent. On the cross, when Christ switched perspectives with us to show us God loves us as himself (imputing his own righteousness on whomever accepts it), Christ was demonstrating both 'ultimate goodness' and 'utlimate meaning' (that which satisfies our hunger for true meaning)--the Golden Rule (self=Other), which corresponds to (describes) his nature, though is not justified by it (is-ought fallacy). See above for the justification part. I am hoping this is received well, this is kind of freaking me out. I'm so honored that you have read and responded to my note. Blessings. :)

August 6, 2011 at 7:54pm

William Lane Craig: Briefly, I was very careful in the Harris debate to say that one can't derive an 'ought' from an 'is' scientifically, as he claims to do.
August 7, 2011 at 5:18pm

Maryann Spikes:

Dr. Craig, so you think one 'can' derive an ought from an is (just not scientifically), and that the is-ought fallacy is not a real fallacy. Do you explain this anywhere? I think Sam Harris departs from science, into philosophy. Richard Chappell writes, “Sam Harris' views on morality would make a lot more sense if he didn't use the term 'science' to mean, apparently, 'rational inquiry'. I agree with him that there are moral truths, just as there are logical and epistemic truths. But it's unhelpful to call these 'scientific' truths. The empirical sciences can of course help us to identify effective means to some presupposed ends. But to work out what ends are worth aiming at in the first place is a distinctively philosophical — not empirical — endeavour.” http://www.philosophyetc.net/2010/10/sam-harris-on-morality.html Note that I do not agree w/ all of Chappell's thoughts in the rest of that post.

August 8, 2011 at 9:41am

"God and Evolution" reading log from Facebook

Some months back, Wintery Knight generously (though with the ulterior motive of converting me from BioLogos to I.D.) sent me "God and Evolution" edited by Jay Richards.  I determined to finish it by the end of the year and did so today.  I present to you my Facebook play-by-play...with some new content in the "after action review".

December 17:

1.  Nothing New Under the Sun by John G. West
2.  Having a Real Debate by John G. West

"How could God 'direct' an 'undirected' process?" p. 40. The answer is a combination of how he performs miracles within the ordinary (miracle) and is sovereign over our free choices. He occasionally directly interacts with that which he always sustains in existence/operation, all without ever violating free will or natural law.

Is "free will" an example of God delegating the task (of creation) to an undirected third party? If no, why is theistic evolution such an example? If yes, how does such delegation defy His sovereignty?

Interesting that Collins (Christian) thinks things appear "random and undirected" while Dawkins (atheist) thinks things appear "designed for a purpose".

Answering Stephen Law's evil god argument

This is a reply to Stephen Law’s “evil god” argument he gave in his debate with William Lane Craig in October.  I first posted a version of it in a comment to my blog post here, in reply to Jason Thibodeau.

Stephen Law cooks up an evidential problem of good against an evil god (reverses the theistic answers to the evidential problem of evil) and then asks why the evidential problem of evil isn’t an equally good argument.  Actually, he asks, “if the evil god hypothesis can, solely on the basis of observational evidence, be ruled out as highly unlikely, why can’t we similarly rule out the good god hypothesis?”

Law considers the privation bit below to be “more of a Catholic thing” which is false—it is not restricted to Catholicism.  I’m not sure ‘why’ Dr. Craig ignores it, but his argument (which Law pretty much ignores) does allude to it:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therefore, objective moral values exist. (Some things are evil!)
4. Therefore, God exists.

But here’s the privation bit, which goes back to Augustine.

In order to sin or commit evil, there must first be a way things ‘should’ have gone—a way things are ‘supposed’ to be—a real ‘ought’—a preexistent good.  A falling short (sin), or privation (evil) [sin=evil], of the way things are supposed to be (the good), cannot exist unless there really is a way things are supposed to be.  See how similar this sounds to Dr. Craig’s argument?

1.  If God does not exist, “the way things are supposed to be” (a real ought/good) does not exist.
2.  Evil (privation of a real ought/good) exists.
3.  Therefore, “the way things are supposed to be” (a real ought/good) exists.
4.  Therefore, God exists.

So—first exists the way things are supposed to be, without which a falling short (sin), or privation (evil), is impossible (again, sin=evil).

That good—that 'way' things are supposed to be—if there IS one—is God.

God, because he is omnipotent, cannot fall short of himself, cannot be a privation of himself, cannot depart from the way things are supposed to be (himself).  [Such falling short, privation, departing--all of those things are weakness.]  Therefore, God can never be evil.  He has the choice—he will just never choose it, because that would be weakness, and he is omnipotent.  This argument goes back to Aquinas.

In short, evil cannot exist without a preexistent good, so whether one observes evil or good, neither can be used to argue for an evil god (because it cannot exist without a preexistent good which is more ultimate), whereas both can be used to argue for a good god (because the presence of good, as well as the presence of evil, requires the existence of a real ‘way things are supposed to be’—God).

This does not prove the existence of God, of course, but it does give us “very good grounds” (Law)—whereas the existence of an evil god is logically incoherent.

Answering Jerry Coyne and Jason Thibodeau on the Euthyphro Dilemma

Maryann, Matt, Tom and Jerry (missing:  Jason)

I’m writing this blog post to get in on the most recent Euthyphro Dilemma dilemma between atheist biologist Jerry Coyne and my fellow Christian Apologetics bloggers Matt Flannagan of MandM and Tom Gilson of Thinking Christian [timely and relevant digression:  Coyne’s fellow atheist biologist Richard Dawkins continues to break an eighth commandment (quoted in The God Delusion) by refusing to test his 747 Gambit in debate with William Lane Craig…I’m still feeling some disappointment].

First, some back-story to get you caught-up…btw, (6) and (5) are out of order because Thibodeau posted before Coyne’s most recent reply:

*Jerry Coyne posted an (1) opinion titled “As atheists know, you can be good without God” on the USAToday Forum in July/August.

*Tom Gilson (2) replied to it on his blog Thinking Christian, August 4. 

*Matt Flannagan (3) also replied on MandM, October 10 (excellent!). 

*Coyne (4) replied to Gilson (Thinking Christian) on Coyne’s blog, October 20. 

*Coyne’s (6) most recent reply (Oct 24) mentions both Flannagan (MandM) and Gilson (Thinking Christian) in order to share (5) Jason Thibodeau’s “The Euthyphro Dilemma is Robust” (Oct 21) (a reply to Flannagan on Thibodeau’s blog).

1.  Ontology vs. Epistemology.

First it is important to distinguish between two problems going on here.  It is one thing to ask “To what in reality does this theory correspond?” (ontology) and another thing to ask “What justifies believing this theory?” (epistemology). 

The Euthyphro Dilemma (below) deals with ontology (how/whether ‘the good’ in general ‘corresponds’ to reality), whereas the Moral Monster Objection deals with epistemology (how we ‘justify’ believing a particular theory in Ethics).

So, it is possible to show the Euthyphro Dilemma to be a false one—to deal with an ontological question—without ever answering any questions dealing with epistemological objections like Moral Monster (or while answering them falsely).

Likewise, it is possible to agree with Jerry Coyne, as Christians do, that we can do/be good without believing in God (Paul reflects the same epistemology in Romans 2:14-15).  However, we are not always good and we do not always do good, so we are not the sort of being to which moral truth corresponds; we are not the sort of being described by moral truth.  When we do/are as we ought to do/be—regardless whether or not we believe God exists—our goodness, if true goodness, corresponds to a good being that is ‘always’ good (God), or it corresponds to nothing (is not real, has no ontology).  That is just another way of discussing William Lane Craig’s argument in Question 44, referred to by Gilson.  Dr. Craig, although he does subscribe to a version of Divine Command Theory not represented by Coyne, does NOT invoke the Divine Command Theory in Question 44, as Coyne falsely claims, Coyne saying it is “too stupid to address”.  Clearly he did not even read Question 44.

2.  The Euthyphro Dilemma and Arbitrariness

Simply put, the Euthyphro Dilemma (from Socrates’ dialogue with Euthyphro) asks whether the good is dependent on God’s commands (a made up, and so fictional, arbitrary good), or whether it is independent of God’s commands, because God’s commands depend on the good (so, no need for a God to ground it—it is higher than God’s commands—and so to what in reality does it correspond?).  This was resolved a long time ago by Aquinas, who explained that God commands in accordance with his good nature—he is that good being to which his commands correspond.  Critics then ask “But what dictates God’s nature?”—If not God, then God is not omnipotent.  If God, then the good is arbitrary.  The answer is that 1) God exists necessarily, as do all his attributes, so his nature, including goodness, is not dictated (he is the Uncaused Cause and his essence and existence are identical), though he is capable of choice, of creation and so forth, and, 2) Aquinas explains that “‘To be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to the omnipotence of God. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence.’[28]” (quoted by Steve Lovell).  Sin is only chosen out of weakness, and being omnipotent, being good, though he has the choice, God will never choose sin, and so in that sense is unable to sin.  On a related note, when Thibodeau writes that “it is possible for an all-loving God to command that we torture kids and thus, on the DCT, it is possible that torturing kids is right,” he is confused.  That it is possible (in one sense) for God to sin does not mean it is possible that sin is right.  And to enjoy watching innocent babies suffer (Thibodeau again) is sin (see my epistemology on the Golden Rule below).

One may be left wondering, “But why is God’s nature good?  Which theory in Ethics best describes God’s nature—egoism, utilitarianism, the categorical imperative, what?  And if we can explain that using good reasons, don’t we have an account of the good that is independent of God?”  First, whatever theory we come up with (epistemology), we must always ask “Is this true?  Does this describe something in reality?” (ontology).  Second, I think one reason the Arbitrariness objection persists is that no one (to my knowledge—correct me if I am wrong) ever attempts to actually answer “Which theory in Ethics best describes God’s nature?” (understandably to avoid losing ground when debating ontology by slipping into epistemology).  However, to that end:  This is my epistemology (the first half is on the Golden Rule, the second half refers to ontology).  This is my ontology (though Aquinas said it first, I only make reference to Hume, and I part ways with Dr. Craig on the is-ought distinction) (here is a brief discussion with Matt Flannagan on my position).  This longer post sums it up and refers back to other posts.  The first objection I hear is that the Golden Rule is found in every major religion and culture and so is not dependent on God.  Again—we agree we can be good without believing in God.  But if there is no God, no theory in Ethics can be true or correspond to anything in reality, not even the Golden Rule.  If you say it is true and corresponds when we do fulfill the Golden Rule, then you are saying it is only ever momentarily true—so what makes it the way we all ought to be, all of the time?  There must be a being ‘to’ which it is true all of the time in order for it to be true ‘for’ everyone.

If the Judeo-Christian concept of God is a Moral Monster and no good God exists, there is not a single theory in Ethics that corresponds to an always-good being in reality (there is no true theory).  If you think there is still the possibility of a good God existing that is not the Judeo-Christian God, just ask yourself:  What is the evidence?  Christians have evidence of God fulfilling the Golden Rule in taking on flesh and switching perspectives with us on the cross.  Crazy, sure—but no other religion has such a demonstration.  The New Atheists who claim there can be a “real” good without a correspondent good being—their epistemology hovers over an abysmal ontology.  Coyne and Thibodeau understandably leave out the nihilist alternative of the atheist existentialists (Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, et cetera) that without a God to which a ‘real’ good may correspond, there is no good beyond what we choose/create/will (there is no moral truth).  They leave it out for the same reason they reject their (straw man) understanding and representation of Divine Command Theory.  Atheists and essentialist Christians all agree that if you (even God) have to make it up (command/dictate it into being), it isn’t ‘true’.  So either the atheist existentialists are right that there is no God, and so there is no good, or essentialist Christians are right that God commands in accordance with his good nature. 

3.  Loose-ends…

So, the ontological questions in the Euthyphro Dilemma are resolved.  The epistemological questions are a completely separate issue.  I referred above to my epistemology (the Golden Rule) and I will defer to others who have addressed the Moral Monster objection elsewhere with different outcomes (William Lane Craig, Matt Flannagan, Paul Copan, et cetera).  I have only briefly (in my opinion) researched it.  I will only say here that to resort to the Moral Monster objection to avoid admitting your moral theory has no ontology is intellectually dishonest.

Lastly, a note on the ‘evolution’ spin.  I believe we evolved (note that I am about to read Jay Richards’ “God and Evolution” given to me by Wintery Knight), and that we evolved a moral sense just as we evolved the ability to reason in general.  If there is moral truth, it did not evolve into being—we merely evolved the ability, or hunger, to apprehend it (even if we still do not recognize the being that ultimately satisfies that hunger).  Any theory in Ethics that grounds its ontology in evolution is a sandcastle for the tides.  Matt Flannagan addressed that issue quite well in his article above (3).

Good without God?

Under every billboard of the sort above, should be the following one (click to get it on its own page)...

Where I am at with Hume's is-ought distinction

The Scottish philosopher David Hume (May 7, 1711-August 25, 1776) lays out the is-ought problem, in book III, part I, section I of his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).  Hume says ought-statements are “entirely different” from is-statements and, in his own style, he challenges readers not to pass unthinkingly over the type of argument that switches from is-statements to ought-statements:

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”^[1]

Philosophers' Carnival call for submissions

I'll be hosting the next Philosophers' Carnival on June 27 (submit by June 25).  Email submission if need be.

.

Some topics I'd like to see in the submissions:

• How can an objectively true moral 'ought' correspond to the 'is' of reality?
• Is free will scientifically possible?  Is moral responsibility possible without it?
• Respond to this:  If the strong sociologist counters with the argument from error, they are affirming a realist premise, since “they rely on the assumption that some past theories were true (or scientifically warranted) despite the weight of received opinion at the time,” (Christopher Norris, Epistemology, Postscript II).
• Respond to this: Admitting that false grounds are false grounds is admitting they are non-justifiers, so that Gettier’s problem examples do not involve instances of justified, true belief, and so do not challenge Plato’s justified-true-belief account of knowledge.
• Does "God commands in accordance with his good nature" and Plato's justified-true-belief requirement for knowledge show Euthyphro's Dilemma to be a false one?
• Hume's fork:  What, if any, is the connection between Hume's is-ought problem (is this really a problem?) and his problem of induction (is this really a problem)?  Did he see a connection?
• Why is there something, rather than nothing?
• Why is every major theory in Ethics compared to the Golden Rule in my Intro. to Ethics text, yet the Golden Rule is not considered as a theory in itself?  Is this common to introductory Ethics texts?
• Why should any and/or every person care about philosophy?
• Show how your favored theory in Ethics is superior to the others by applying each to a current event or common moral dilemma.  Top it off with the first question in this list.
• Feel free to reply to this blog post and submit your own with other good ideas.

God (is) the Golden Rule (ought) without offending Hume

Would very much appreciate some feedback on this.  I have tried to put all of it in my own words without referring to influential sources. 

Clearly some of it needs more reasons (like the GR’s presence in every culture/religion, how the GR resolves practical ethical dilemmas, the evidence for Jesus’ death/resurrection, biblical basis, et cetera), but the following is just a summary.  If given the time and opportunity, I’d expand upon it.  Any thoughts on the following?...

Natural law, divine command and Euthyphro's dilemma resolved

...using Hume's is-ought distinction's mirror concept, the ought-is distinction***.

Euthyphro's dilemma:  "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious?  Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"  This can be reworded to read "Is the good commanded by God because it is good?  Or is it good because it is commanded by God?"  The first question addresses theistic natural law theory, and the second question addresses divine command theory.

Natural law theory: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious?"  God commands whatever is good despite his commanding it. Because this good (which anyone can justify using reason) does not correspond to perfect being, it commits the ought-is fallacy. According to this theory, good is over God.

Divine command theory: "Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"  Good is whatever God commands. Because this good does not correspond to perfect being and God makes it up, it also commits the ought-is fallacy. If you say that "God's commands are good because God exists" you commit the is-ought fallacy. According to this theory, God is over good.

Synthesis: God commands in accordance with His good nature/essence. Good is good despite God's command and anyone can reason to it, but it corresponds to perfect being (God). For the sake of argument, if no God exists, all good-concepts correspond to nothing and commit the ought-is fallacy, and using this synthesis to argue for good's or God's existence commits the ought-is fallacy. Again, if you say that "Good is good because God exists" you commit the is-ought fallacy. According to this synthesis, God is good.

At the bottom of this relevant link are more relevant links going into more detail without using the words "natural law" or "divine command".

***Hume's is-ought (existence-justification) distinction says you cannot use the existence of the status quo (the way things are) to justify (belief in) the status quo—1) just because we have a natural inclination to act a certain way does not mean it is a good thing to do, and 2) just because the sun rises and sets every morning does not mean we have a good theory about sunrises and sunsets (we may believe the sun revolves around the earth!). Flipped around, the ought-is (justification-existence) distinction says you cannot say something (good, God, or anything else) exists just because its existence is justified (iow, just because you have reasons to believe, or to want to believe, it exists)—sometimes we are wrong about something even though we have good reasons to think we are right. This is true about things we do, and about things we 'think' we know.

In order to avoid the is-ought/ought-is problem, our belief (about good, God or anything else) must both be justified and correspond to reality.

Hume's is-ought, Plato's true-justified, Euthyphro's dilemma and Gettier's problem

Hume's is-ought (fact-value) distinction is the same as Plato's true-justified distinction.  When is/true/fact and ought/justified/value are not kept distinct, the Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology ensues:  Are we justified in believing (ought we believe) merely because our belief is true (can truth justify belief without evidence?), or is our belief true because we are justified in believing (because we ought to believe)(does evidence make belief true?)?

The solution:  Our belief is 1) justified (we ought to believe) by the evidence, and 2) true by correspondence.  Gettier's problem examples, though meant to challenge Plato's justified-true-belief theory of knowledge, show that just because a belief is true (is), does not make it justified (ought), and just because a belief is justified (ought), does not make it true (is).  Gettier's problem and Euthyphro's dilemma only arise when we get is/true and ought/justified tangled together (Hume's is-ought problem), when we forget to keep them distinct, as Plato kept them in his requirement that belief be "both" justified "and" true, in order to count as knowledge.

[Note on belief scales:  There can be degrees of justification, but truth is either/or.  This means that beliefs cannot be "more or less" true (known), only "more or less" justified (believed)--that is why apisticism (lack of belief) is the mid-range (or 'on the equator') between polar beliefs (like atheism/theism), not agnosticism (lack of knowledge, as a conclusion--as opposed to Huxley's process of questioning, pre-conclusion).]

Relevant posts which go into more detail on the above:
The New, New Theism
Replacing Agnosticism with Apisticism
Is-ought fallacy and knowledge as justified-true-belief
Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief?
Answering Gettier
Atheism and agnosticism (really, apisticism) as belief
Natural law, divine command and Euthyphro's dilemma resolved using Hume's is-ought distinction

Answering Gettier

[ work in progress ] [ completed 1/15/11 ]

Plato’s justified-true-belief definition of knowledge, maintained by critical realists, besides requiring that a belief be justified by evidence and true by correspondence, says 1) whether or not a belief is true has no bearing on whether or not it is justified, and 2) a belief is true or not regardless whatever justification we are (un)able to find for it. To violate 1 is to commit David Hume’s is-ought fallacy, and to violate 2 is to commit its reverse. The skeptic’s argument from error confirms that justification does not equate to truth (ought=/=is) when it notes that sometimes what we thought was justified turns out to have been false. Edmund Gettier’s problem examples also note this, but they also confirm that truth does not equate to justification (is=/=ought) when they show that sometimes we are right for the wrong reasons (and really the skeptic’s argument from error could also be saying this). Hume thought his is-ought fallacy leads to skepticism about knowledge (originally, moral knowledge), but this is prevented by following the requirement that a belief (i.e., an ethical theory) be justified by evidence and true by correspondence. However, Gettier’s point with his problem examples, in Christopher Norris’ words, “is that people can hold beliefs which are indeed justified and true, but which for various reasons intuitively strike us as not meeting the requirements for genuine knowledge,” (p. 140). Where Gettier goes wrong is when he allows wrong reasons to pass as justification—his whole basis for challenging the justified-true-belief definition of knowledge.

Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief?

[ Section on Gettier revised 1/7/11 ]
[ Mention of Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology revised 2/23/11 ]

When deciding whether knowledge is justified, true belief (Plato), a question arises: Is the truth of a belief 1) external to the knower and true whether or not the belief is recognized ‘by’ the knower as justified by the evidence (as realists would say), or is truth 2) internal to and therefore the evidence-based, best opinion of the knower (as anti-realists would say)?

Replacing Agnosticism with Apisticism

This article argues we replace the word "agnosticism" (lack of knowing) with the word "apisticism" (lack of believing) on every belief scale.  The current debate between Myers and Coyne on the